{"id":92003,"date":"2017-12-02T09:40:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T09:40:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-06T20:53:48","modified_gmt":"2023-01-06T20:53:48","slug":"about-those-losses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/about-those-losses\/","title":{"rendered":"About Those Losses&#8230;."},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>Moscow&#8217;s independent Center for the Analysis of Strategy and Technology  (CAST) is offering new details on Russia&#8217;s air campaign against Georgia  last year.<\/p>\n<p>CAST was one of the first analytical organizations to  report that Russian air losses over Georgia were significantly higher  than the Kremlin claimed. CAST researchers have determined that the  Russian Air Force lost at least eight aircraft in fighting with the  Georgians&#8211;twice the number officially reported.<\/p>\n<p>In its latest  assessment, CAST confirms that Russian forces lost eight aircraft to  adversary air defenses and fratricide. The four additional  aircraft&#8211;which the Russian Air Force has acknowledged as combat  losses&#8211;include the following:<\/p>\n<p>&#8211;SU-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance aircraft, shot down on 8 August<br \/>&#8211;SU-25 Frogfoot CAS aircraft, lost on 9 August<br \/>&#8211;SU-24M Fencer frontal strike aircraft, downed on 10 or 11 August<br \/>&#8211;Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship (loss date undetermined)<\/p>\n<p>CAST also reports that Georgian air defenses damaged at least three other SU-25s, which managed to return to base.<\/p>\n<p>Officially,  Moscow has claimed that it lost only four aircraft during the Georgian  campaign, a TU-22M Backfire bomber and three SU-25s, all shot down on  the first day of the war (8 August). Russian Air Force officials say the  four jets were downed by Georgian SA-11 SAM batteries.<\/p>\n<p>As for  those &#8220;other&#8221; losses, CAST claims the Fencers fell victim to  shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles while the SU-25 was downed by  friendly fire&#8211;specifically, a MANPAD SAM launched by a Russian ground  unit.<\/p>\n<p>The think tank also repeats its assessment that Russian Air  Force units were unprepared for operations against a relatively modern  air defense system. We second that notion, and believe it&#8217;s worth  repeating a related point, <a href=\"http:\/\/formerspook.blogspot.com\/2008\/08\/russias-black-eyes-in-georgia.html\">which we made last August<\/a>.  Moscow&#8217;s lack of preparation is largely inexcusable, since it already  knew that Tiblisi had purchased the SA-11 (and other air defense  systems) from Ukraine. The embarrassment is compounded by the fact that  the systems which knocked down those Russian aircraft were originally  designed&#8211;and built&#8211;<em>in Russia<\/em> (emphasis ours).<\/p>\n<p>Moscow  claims that it overcame the initial setbacks and eventually destroyed  the Georgian air defense system. But we take those statements with a  grain of salt. To our knowledge, the Russians have never released UAV  imagery (or other evidence) that would support those assertions.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally,  Georgian air defense teams proved adept at concealing their locations  during the war, using a combination of denial-and-deception and mobility  tactics. There is every reason to believe that some Georgian SAM  batteries and MANPAD crews survived the war, gaining combat experience  and valuable insight into Russian tactics and employment strategies.<\/p>\n<p>CAST  also offers a couple of new wrinkles in its revised assessment, though  we can&#8217;t confirm either one. They claim that Georgia complemented its  Russian-made SAMs with an Israeli air defense system, built around the  advanced Derby and Python-5 air-to-air missiles. The Israeli SAM is  believed similar to ground-based versions of the U.S. AIM-120, nicknamed  the SLAMRAAM.<\/p>\n<p>Russian defense analysts are depicting last year&#8217;s  air campaign as the first conducted against a relatively modern air  defense system. And, there&#8217;s an element of truth in that. Previous air  operations (Desert Storm; Allied Force; Iraqi Freedom) were largely  waged against older air defense systems, which are more vulnerable to  jamming, anti-radiation missiles and other counter-measures.<\/p>\n<p>Still,  western air forces are better prepared for advanced SAMs than their  Russian counterparts. Threat emitters used on training ranges in the  U.S., Europe and Israel simulate the radar signals from &#8220;double-digit&#8221;  air defense systems, giving pilots a chance to practice against them,  before entering combat. Modern air defenses are also replicated during  major force employment exercises, including Red Flag.<\/p>\n<p>Russia, on  the other hand, has a ways to go in providing realistic threat training  for its aircrews. Calling that ironic would be an understatement. For 50  years, Russian scientists and engineers have produced some of the  world&#8217;s most lethal air defense systems. But Moscow never believed its  pilots would have to fly against Russian-built SAMs. That&#8217;s one reason  the Russian Air Force learned a hard lesson in Georgia last summer.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Moscow&#8217;s independent Center for the Analysis of Strategy and Technology (CAST) is offering new details on Russia&#8217;s air campaign against Georgia last year. CAST was one of the first analytical organizations to report that Russian air losses over Georgia were significantly higher than the Kremlin claimed. CAST researchers have determined that the Russian Air Force [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/92003"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=92003"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/92003\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=92003"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=92003"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=92003"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}