{"id":91957,"date":"2017-12-02T10:00:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T10:00:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-06T20:53:31","modified_gmt":"2023-01-06T20:53:31","slug":"the-trouble-with-nies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/the-trouble-with-nies\/","title":{"rendered":"The Trouble With NIEs"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>For many Americans, the infamous 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on  Iran&#8217;s nuclear program was a head-scratching moment.  After months of  research, writing and editing, the nation&#8217;s intel community offered a  contradictory, bottom-line assessment on Tehran&#8217;s nuclear intentions. <\/p>\n<p>While  concluding that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons development  effort in 2003, analysts noted Iran was still working on other functions  required to produce an atomic bomb, including uranium enrichment and  development of long-range delivery platforms.  In other words, the pause  was something of a mirage, but the NIE served its apparent purpose:  preventing the Bush Administration from launching military action  against Iran. <\/p>\n<p>All NIEs are produced under the auspices of the  National Intelligence Council (NIC), which was created in 1979 to serve  as a focal point for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking within  the community.  As part of its portfolio, the NIC inherited  responsibility for National Intelligence Estimates, the latest version  of long-term assessments that were first produced in the 1950s. <\/p>\n<p>The  NIC has been in the news recently, thanks to the Obama Administration&#8217;s  attempt to install Ambassador Charles Freeman as the new chairman of  that body.  Freeman&#8217;s nomination drew fire from all sides of the  political spectrum.  Critics derided Freeman for his anti-Israeli  statements; his cozy relationship with the Saudi government, and a  dismissive attitude toward the 1989 Tinammen Square crackdown. <\/p>\n<p>Lost  amid that shuffle was another disqualifier&#8211;the fact that Ambassador  Freeman had no prior intel experience, except as a consumer of  intelligence products.  With that hole in his resume, the Ambassador was  an odd choice to supervise&#8211;and revitalize&#8211;the production of key intel  estimates.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2009\/03\/13\/AR2009031302096.html\">But as Mark Lowenthal reminds us in today&#8217;s <em>Washington Post<\/em><\/a>,  the NIE process has serious problems that go well beyond the National  Intelligence Council.   For six decades, the intel community has  generated key assessments (including the flagship NIEs) that are  ponderous, occasionally irrelevant&#8211;and rarely read by their target  audience, including senior elected officials and other policy-makers. <\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The  roots of the NIC go back to the early 1950s, when Director of Central  Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith created an Office of National Estimates  to produce long-term strategic analyses that would provide the  president and his senior advisers with the consensus views of the  government&#8217;s various intelligence agencies. These documents, called  National Intelligence Estimates, quickly ran into trouble. As early as  the mid-&#8217;50s, a survey found that the main audience for these lengthy  documents was junior staff members who used the estimates to help them  brief their superiors. The survey also found that NIEs were considered  too ponderous and that readers questioned how the &#8220;consensus&#8221; was  achieved.   <\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"> It hasn&#8217;t gotten any better since then. In fact, not only are the  estimates too unwieldy to be of any use, they generate distracting and  dangerous controversy because they are so susceptible to political  &#8220;cherry-picking.&#8221;<br \/>Take one of the most infamous examples. The 2002  estimate claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction had  little influence on anyone&#8217;s decision about going to war. Only six  senators actually read the NIE, but 77 voted to authorize the use of  force. As analytically flawed as that estimate might have been, the one  intelligence &#8220;sin&#8221; the council did not commit was &#8220;politicization&#8221; &#8212;  that is, writing what the policymaker wants to hear. Even the Senate  intelligence committee&#8217;s investigation of the Iraq NIE agreed; it wasn&#8217;t  politicized to support invasion. <\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">[snip]<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"> But these controversies actually exaggerate the importance of these  documents in the policy process. The estimates haven&#8217;t improved much  since that survey of 54 years ago. They remain long, ponderous,  sometimes tortuously written and largely lacking in influence. As a  senior intelligence officer during the Bush administration, I led a team  that conducted an extensive biannual review of intelligence  performance. As part of this evaluation, we asked senior policymakers  which intelligence products they found most useful. In each evaluation,  NIEs came in last or next to last.       <\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>Lowenthal,  who served as Vice-Chairman of the NIC from 2002-2005, understands that  the process is broken.  But he doesn&#8217;t offer any real recommendations  for fixing the problem, and there&#8217;s the rub.  Everyone hates the current  approach, but no one seems able to come up with a better one. <\/p>\n<p>A  few wags have suggested scrapping the system altogether, and there&#8217;s a  certain logic in that.  Still, the intelligence community can hardly  abandon the long-range estimate business, nor can it avoid consensus  assessments on critical subjects.  <\/p>\n<p>As a first step toward  reform, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) might consider wider  community representation within the council.  Currently, most of the  members fit a particular template, which is long on advanced degrees and  academic expertise in specific geographic areas or geopolitical issues.   In terms of agency experience, the NIC is heavily weighted toward  former CIA and State Department officials. <\/p>\n<p>Nothing wrong with  that, but wouldn&#8217;t the NIC benefit from experts draw from other  organizations?  It&#8217;s rather stunning that the council&#8217;s current  membership does not include a single career officer from the National  Security Agency, or someone who &#8220;grew up&#8221; on the operations side of the  CIA.  And, despite the impact of intel assessments on our armed forces,  only one council member has a background in military intelligence.   There also appears to be a lack of expertise in emerging intel  technologies (think MASINT) at the upper levels of the NIC.    <\/p>\n<p>To  be fair, major assessments are never based on a single intelligence  discipline, and the council has plenty of experts among its support  staff&#8211;and the agency analysts who contribute to the process.  But, to  effectively guide long-term Intel assessments, the NIC needs to reflect  the current threat environment, and the expertise required to analyze  those issues.  Facing terrorism and other transnational issues, a  council populated by &#8220;old line&#8221; experts on the Soviet Union, China and  traditional geographic regions could certainly use some fresh  perspectives. <\/p>\n<p>Not to mention an end to the politics that produced aberrations like the Iran NIE.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For many Americans, the infamous 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran&#8217;s nuclear program was a head-scratching moment. After months of research, writing and editing, the nation&#8217;s intel community offered a contradictory, bottom-line assessment on Tehran&#8217;s nuclear intentions. While concluding that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons development effort in 2003, analysts noted Iran was still [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/91957"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=91957"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/91957\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=91957"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=91957"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=91957"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}