{"id":91802,"date":"2017-12-02T16:04:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T16:04:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-06T20:52:26","modified_gmt":"2023-01-06T20:52:26","slug":"toward-nuclear-free-world","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/toward-nuclear-free-world\/","title":{"rendered":"Toward a Nuclear-Free World?"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>There&#8217;s a rather <a href=\"http:\/\/online.wsj.com\/article\/SB120036422673589947.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries\">substantive op-ed in today&#8217;s edition of <em>The Wall Street Journal<\/em><\/a>,  signed by two former Secretaries of State (George Shultz and Henry  Kissinger); a former Secretary of Defense (William J. Perry) and a  retired Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn. So,  it&#8217;s hardly your typical opinion piece.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, the ideas  expressed in the piece have been endorsed&#8211;to varying degrees&#8211;by a  veritable Who&#8217;s-Who of the U.S. national security establishment over the  past 30 years. That list includes (by our count) five past secretaries  of state; four former SecDefs and five retired national security  advisers. Apparently, the only people who haven&#8217;t signed off on the  piece are either dead, or currently serving in the defense or diplomatic  communities.<\/p>\n<p>With the support of that many big thinkers and  heavy hitters, you&#8217;d expect that the op-ed is devoted to a weighty  topic, and it doesn&#8217;t disappoint (at least, in that regard). Entitled  &#8220;Toward a Nuclear-Free World,&#8221; it&#8217;s actually a follow-up to an earlier  commentary, also published in the <em>WSJ<\/em>. The original piece  called for called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear  weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and  ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. But, the authors argue  that more must be done, to pull back from the nuclear precipice:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The  accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear  material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real  possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into  dangerous hands.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><br \/>The steps we  are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger.  With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly  effective and increasingly hazardous.<br \/><\/span><span style=\"font-size: 100%;\">And, some of the recommendations offered in the op-ed actually make sense. They include: <\/span><\/p>\n<p><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">-Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 <\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">-Take  steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all  nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental  or unauthorized attacks.<\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">-Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems<\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">-Dramatically  accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security  for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the  world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<p><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">-Strengthen  the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation  Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies.<\/span><\/em><br \/><em><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><\/em><br \/>Still,  the op-ed is disappointing in many respects&#8211;some would even say naive.  First, the national security heavyweights seem to be locked in a 1970s  time warp, when there were only five declared nuclear powers: the United  States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. In that era,  negotiations and treaties between &#8220;rational&#8221; state actors made a great  deal of sense, although many of those agreements gave the Soviet Union  an edge in many strategic categories.<\/p>\n<p>Obviously, the nature of  the nuclear threat has shifted dramatically over the past three  decades&#8211;a fact the authors readily acknowledge. In addition to a  possible nuclear attack by terrorists, there is the growing danger posed  by new members to the nuclear club. How do you persuade nations like  India, Pakistan and even Israel to give up their nuclear option&#8211;weapons  viewed in those countries as a critical deterrent, even necessary for  national survival. Building &#8220;an international consensus&#8221; on nuclear  priorities is fine, but getting countries to sign on and comply is going  to be difficult.<\/p>\n<p>China offers a case in point. Over the past  decade, Beijing has expanded its strategic forces and assembled  powerful, theater-level nuclear assets opposite Taiwan. Today, more than  700 short and medium-range missiles (virtually all nuclear-capable) are  available for operations in the Strait of Taiwan or the Sea of Japan.  Beijing&#8217;s goals are simple: build a force that is capable of pounding  Taiwan into submission, and defeat U.S. forces that would come to the  rescue of that nation.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, China is quite serious about  fielding advanced sea and land-based systems that hold the U.S.  homeland at risk. A decade ago, a PLA general famously asked his  American counterpart if we were &#8220;willing to trade Los Angeles for  Taipei.&#8221; He wasn&#8217;t kidding, and his comment drives home an essential  point: How do you dissuade Beijing from becoming a nuclear peer  competitor of the United States? On that critical issue, the op-ed  authors are a little vague, beyond the usual talk of global consensus,  increased monitoring and stronger anti-proliferation regimes.<\/p>\n<p>There&#8217;s  also the grim realization that the Shultz\/Kissinger\/Perry\/Nunn et.al  approach doesn&#8217;t work particularly well with rogue states. Almost a year  after the Six Party nuclear agreement with North Korea, Kim Jong-il has  yet to provide a full disclosure of his nation&#8217;s nuclear stockpile.  More disturbing, there is evidence that nuclear &#8220;material&#8221; from  Pyongyang made its way to a covert facility in Syria, which was struck  by Israeli jets last September. Anti-proliferation measures based on  diplomacy and accords are only as good as the word of the signatories.  Why should anyone believe that North Korea will be more forthcoming and  transparent in the future, given its long history of cheating?<\/p>\n<p>Then,  there&#8217;s the little matter of Iran. Not only is the issue of Tehran&#8217;s  nuclear program far from resolved, their efforts are being aided by  Russia&#8211;one of the nation&#8217;s that is supposed to lead a revitalized  non-proliferation effort. Mikhail Gorbachev may support the ideas  outlined in the <em>WSJ <\/em>op-ed, but the current Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, apparently isn&#8217;t a subscriber.<\/p>\n<p>Not  only is Mr. Putin providing equipment, fuel and expertise that could  aid in Iran&#8217;s effort to obtain nuclear weapons, he is also upgrading his  own strategic arsenal, with deployment of a new generation of ICBMs.  Putin has also expressed strong support for weapons like the hypersonic  glide vehicle (HGV), designed specifically to defeat defensive systems  like long-range detection radars and ballistic missile defenses. As long  as Russia works at conflicting goals in the nuclear arena, efforts at  non-proliferation will be hollow, at best.<\/p>\n<p>The ideas outlined in  today&#8217;s op-ed also make little mention of what happens when diplomacy  and treaties fail. In reality, the threat from Saddam&#8217;s nuclear program  didn&#8217;t officially end until coalition troops rolled into Iraq in the  spring of 2003. As long as the Baathist regime remained in power, Saddam  retained the option of reviving his nuclear program, despite years of  IAEA inspections.<\/p>\n<p>It&#8217;s also worth remembering that the same military might that toppled Saddam Hussein <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2003\/WORLD\/africa\/12\/19\/libya.nuclear\/index.html\">also convinced Libya&#8217;s Moammar Gadhafi to abandon his nuclear ambitions<\/a>.  We subsequently learned that the Libyan effort was much more advanced  than previously thought. Touring Libya&#8217;s facilities, U.S. and British  intelligence specialists found a very &#8220;robust&#8221; program, complete with  assembled centrifuges for uranium enrichment, and thousands of  centrifuge parts.<\/p>\n<p>Had the U.S. and its partners not invaded Iraq,  we can only wonder how quickly Gadhafi would have obtained nuclear  weapons. Our discoveries in Libya was hardly an endorsement of  &#8220;traditional&#8221; non-proliferation efforts and it raises the salient  question: at what point is the world community prepared to intervene  militarily, in order to deny nuclear weapons to a rogue state. On that  count, the authors of the WSJ op-ed fail to provide a satisfactory  answer.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, the former national security leaders ignore  other indisputable facts about nuclear weapons: they provide a real  deterrent value, and they&#8217;re cheaper than conventional forces. Nukes  helped keep the peace during the Cold War and they still have a limiting  effect on potential adversaries. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be crazy, but  there are those in Tehran who understand that a nuclear attack on Israel  (or U.S. forces in the Middle East) would result in swift retaliation  and the destruction of Iran.<\/p>\n<p>Will that realization ultimately  check Iran&#8217;s drive for nuclear weapons? Only time will tell. Perhaps the  question ought to be re-phrased and re-directed at our own side, toward  those former officials striving for the ultimate elimination of nukes.  At what point, we should ask, are they willing to give up the deterrent  value offered by such weapons? And, are they willing to make the  corresponding increase in conventional weapons that will be required by  getting rid of our nuclear inventory?<\/p>\n<p>Lest we forget, the U.S.  Army and Marine Corps are currently embarked on a program that will  provide a modest increase in our ground forces. Reaching that goal will  take at least five years and billions of dollars. The cost of fielding  additional air, ground and naval units that would only <em>partially <\/em>replace  our nuclear arsenal would be even more expensive. Any savings derived  from eliminating nuclear weapons would be more than offset by staggering  increases in expenditures in conventional weapons.<\/p>\n<p>There is no  doubt that nuclear non-proliferation is an important challenge. And the  men and women who wrote today&#8217;s op-ed (or endorsed it) are sober and  serious in their views. Based on their experience as senior national  security officials, they understand that the goal of a &#8220;nuclear-free  world&#8221; is like viewing a distant mountain. They write:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;<span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">From  the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can&#8217;t even see the  top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can&#8217;t get  there from here. But the risks from continuing to go down the mountain  or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher  ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible.&#8221; <\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>But,  in pursuit of a safer world, we must ensure that their far-off mountain  is indeed a realistic goal&#8211;and not merely a mirage.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>There&#8217;s a rather substantive op-ed in today&#8217;s edition of The Wall Street Journal, signed by two former Secretaries of State (George Shultz and Henry Kissinger); a former Secretary of Defense (William J. Perry) and a retired Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn. So, it&#8217;s hardly your typical opinion piece. Moreover, the ideas [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/91802"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=91802"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/91802\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=91802"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=91802"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=91802"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}