{"id":85219,"date":"2018-03-06T08:30:00","date_gmt":"2018-03-06T08:30:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-06T19:59:03","modified_gmt":"2023-01-06T19:59:03","slug":"east-timor-independence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2018\/03\/06\/east-timor-independence\/","title":{"rendered":"\u041c\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443\u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f  East Timor Independence"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><div style=\"background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #333333; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin: 0px 0px 0px 13px;\"><noindex><center><\/p>\n<div style=\"padding: 30px 0px 30px 20px;\"><\/div>\n<p><\/center><\/noindex><\/div>\n<pre style=\"background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #333333; font-size: 12px; padding-left: 18px;\">East Timor Independence?<br \/>                                  Contents.<br \/> . Introduction \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 3<br \/> . Ethnological origin, demography and policy \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 3<br \/> . Before and after the arrival of the Europeans \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 6<br \/> . Japanese occupation during World War II \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20267<br \/> . The Portuguese colonial empire \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 8<br \/> . Indonesian invasion \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 10<br \/> . Introduction to Indonesia \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 12<br \/> . Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 13<br \/> . Formation of East-Timorese political associations \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026  17<br \/> . The parties \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.  18<br \/> . Australian support \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.  21<br \/> . USA admits Timorese right to self-determination \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..  23<br \/> . Indonesia admits independence \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 23<br \/> . Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese<br \/>   Republic on the Question of East Timor \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..  24<br \/> . Conclusion \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026 26<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>                                Introduction.<br \/>      It is not easy to write with feigned calm  and  dispassion  about  the<br \/>events that have  been  unfolding  in  East  Timor.  Horror  and  shame  are<br \/>compounded by the fact that the crimes are so familiar and could  so  easily<br \/>have been halted by the international community a long time ago.<br \/>      Timor, the Malay  word  for  \"Orient\",  is  an  island  of  the  Malay<br \/>Archipelago, the  largest  and  easternmost  of  the  Lesser  Sundas,  lying<br \/>between parallels 8  deg.  17'  and  10  deg.  22'  of  south  latitude  and<br \/>meridians 123 deg. 25' and 127 deg. 19' of latitude east from Greenwich.  It<br \/>is bathed by the Indian Ocean  (Timor  Sea)  at  South,  and  Pacific  Ocean<br \/>(Banda Sea) at North and has an oblong configuration  in  the  direction  of<br \/>southwest -- northeast. The island is  surrounded  by  the  Roti  and  Saval<br \/>islands through the Roti Strait, by the Lomblem, Pantar  and  Ombai  islands<br \/>across the Ombai Strait and by Kissar isle  to  the  northeast.  Southwards,<br \/>Australia dists about 500 km, and 1000 km separates the southwest  point  of<br \/>Timor from Java.<br \/>      The total area of Timor is of 32 350 sq km, measuring the maximums  of<br \/>470 km in length and 110 km in width. About 480 km wide, and  a  surface  of<br \/>450 000 sq km, the Timor Sea which is divided between the  two  territories,<br \/>opening west into the Indian Ocean and east into the Arafura  Sea,  part  of<br \/>the Pacific Ocean.<br \/>      The territory of the island -- East  Timor--  of  which  Portugal  was<br \/>recognized administrative power by United  Nations,  occupies  an  estimated<br \/>area of almost 19 000 km, and comprises the  eastern  half  of  the  island,<br \/>with 265 km in length and 92 km of maximum width and an area of  16  384  km<br \/>and the enclave of Ocussi-Ambeno that dists 70 km from Batugadi, with 2  461<br \/>sq km and a coastline 48 km long. Still part of East Timor is the island  of<br \/>Ataero (or Pulo-Cambing) with 144 sq  km,  just  23  km  northwards  of  the<br \/>capital Dili and the tiny isle of Jaco with 8  sq  km,  being  the  oriental<br \/>extreme of East Timor just ahead of Tutuala.<br \/><br \/><br \/>                 Ethnological origin, demography and policy.<br \/><br \/><br \/>      There are 12 ethnic groups in East Timor each of  which  has  its  own<br \/>language: 9 Austronesian language groups - Tetum, Mambai,  Tokodede,  Kemak,<br \/>Galoli, Idate, Waima'a, Naueti;  and  3  Papuan  language  groups  -  Bunak,<br \/>Makasae, Fatuluku. The Tetum live in two separate  geographic  areas  within<br \/>East Timor. A simplified version of the Tetum language was utilised in  Dili<br \/>by the Portuguese as a lingua franca. This language  has  spread  throughout<br \/>East Timor so that Tetum, in its original or simplified  form,  came  to  be<br \/>spoken by about  60%  of  the  population.  Though  widespread,  it  is  not<br \/>understood by all.<br \/>      One of the first references to the natives of East Timor is  expressed<br \/>in the description that in 1514 the Portuguese Rui de Brito sent to king  D.<br \/>Manuel. In our free transcription, he wrote in these  terms:  \u201cTimor  is  an<br \/>island beyond Java, has plenty sandalwood, plenty honey, plenty wax,  hasn't<br \/>junks for navigating, is a big island of kaffirs.\u201d<br \/>      The `kaffir' is meant to refer to the \u201cblack and  of  troubled  hair\u201d.<br \/>Timorese what, not being untrue, was an imprecise observation  as  the  type<br \/>was to be found only in some regions, specially in Ocussi,  and  generically<br \/>in West Timor.<br \/>      From the antrophological point of view, the island arouses the  upmost<br \/>scientific interest such is the heterogeneity of it's people.<br \/>      For centuries the East Timorese had been farmers, living in  scattered<br \/>hamlets and eating what they grew. Only a few  coastal  East  Timorese  were<br \/>fishermen. Trading and shop keeping had for generations been  in  the  hands<br \/>of the Chinese. East Timor is extremely  mountainous,  so  the  majority  of<br \/>East Timorese had always lived in isolation,  far  from  towns  and  foreign<br \/>influences, tied to their  fields  and  animistic  practices.  In  spite  of<br \/>centuries of Catholic missionary work by the Portuguese,  in  1975  animists<br \/>still numbered as much as 72 % of the population. The local  Timorese  kings<br \/>still played an important  part  in  their  lives  and  allegiances,  whilst<br \/>interference from Portuguese administrators and  military  was  almost  non-<br \/>existent.<br \/>      In the period between World War 2 and the 1975 Indonesian invasion,  a<br \/>number of East Timorese managed to gain an education  in  the  colony's  few<br \/>schools. Some were mestizos, of Timorese and  Portuguese  parentage,  others<br \/>were Timorese from  traditional  ruling  families,  but  the  majority  were<br \/>native Timorese who  gained  their  education  through  the  Catholic  minor<br \/>seminary. The emergence of this small educated elite in the 1960s and  1970s<br \/>ensured that, when the Portuguese left East  Timor  in  1975,  these  people<br \/>with  schooling,  and  nationalist  aspirations,  became   the   territory's<br \/>leaders.<br \/>      Politically,  socially  and  ethnologically  Timorese  differ  amongst<br \/>themselves  in  groups.  There  is  the  division   in   independent   sucos<br \/>(kingdoms),  the  distinction  between  the  Atoni  tribes  of  the  Servian<br \/>kingdom, in West Timor, and the Belos of the  Portuguese  territory,  groups<br \/>such as the Firacos, ethnic designation adopted by the Timorese  in  between<br \/>Baucau and Luca, or the Caladi which are  the  inhabitants  of  the  central<br \/>crest , Malays  and  non-Malays,  so  many  \"sucos\"  and  more  than  twenty<br \/>languages  and  dialects,  the  contribution  of  the  exogamy,  of  parties<br \/>irreconcilable. In conclusion, that is the expression of a relative  absence<br \/>of bio-ethnic unity of the populations.<br \/>      The history of a People and their Culture  voted  to  banishment  from<br \/>their motherland, the eastern half of an island,  former  Portuguese  colony<br \/>is the much unknown. Timor lies in  South  East  Asia  enclosed  in  world's<br \/>largest archipelago.  That  is  Indonesia,  which  gave  it's  name  to  the<br \/>Republic  constituted  after  the  dutch  withdrawl.  Since  the  beginning,<br \/>Indonesian governments have experienced resistance coming  from  independist<br \/>movements of various islands which claim  ethnical  and  cultural  diveristy<br \/>from the predominant  Javanese  type.  Nonetheless  they  were  continuously<br \/>silenced thus unable to internationalize  the  situation  to  a  stage  that<br \/>would force foreign intervention. When it became inevitable, in that  single<br \/>exception of the western half of New Guinea, the  autodetermination  of  the<br \/>papuans in favour  of  an  integration  in  Indonesia  was  observed  as  an<br \/>Indonesian orchestrated act, and  remembered  until  today  as  the  darkest<br \/>episode in the history of UN.<br \/>      Indonesia couldn't either afford the  regional  instability  that  the<br \/>prospect of a small nation rising in between the empire would  arouse  .This<br \/>solitary piece of territory and it's inhabitants had to be sacrificed for  a<br \/>hugger cause.<br \/>      Portugal which's vast colonial possessions had once made  the  country<br \/>great, with times had become responsible for it's retardment.  The  drawling<br \/>of the situation was put to an end with a successful coup d'etat,  in  April<br \/>'74, which engaged a national revolution ceasing dictatorship  and  commited<br \/>to decolonization. Meanwhile, if East Timor, due to  distance  and  expense,<br \/>was already the most forgotten colony, less attention it was  given  towards<br \/>the definition of it's future  as  the  longed  changes  in  the  metropolis<br \/>didn't avoid internal deviations and contradictions. It brought  instability<br \/>to the government of the country  and  the  urgence  to  lay  the  basis  of<br \/>democracy.<br \/>      For Indonesia however, the solution was announced: annexation  by  any<br \/>terms. As it couldn't be done without  cover-up,  the  Indonesian  accounted<br \/>the \"ignorance\" of Timor's closest neighbor, Australia, offering  access  to<br \/>the Timor Gap  for  oil.  The  maintenance  of  economic  and  institutional<br \/>relations  was  (is)  too   important.   Necessary   non-interference   from<br \/>superpower USA was also naturally reached.  Having  the  Americans  weakened<br \/>their position in South East Asia after Vietnam, Indonesia was  regarded  as<br \/>the last great bastion of  anti-communism  in  the  region,  essentially  in<br \/>those years for reasons of  military  strategy  as  we'll  see  ahead.  Thus<br \/>friendly relations were very important to preserve.<br \/>      So, in name of political, economical  and  military  goals,  with  two<br \/>major countries making it possible for the  pretender  of  East  Timor,  and<br \/>before the impotence of Administrative Power Portugal, Indonesia invaded  in<br \/>December '75, interrupting  a  process  of  decolonization  in  course.  The<br \/>action was promptly condemned by the United Nations.  Although  in  face  of<br \/>International Law, and of the most elementary  human  rights,  Indonesia  is<br \/>regularly criticized by the  International  Community,  East  Timor  remains<br \/>still insignificant to put at stake superior governmental interests.<br \/>      As the case of East Timor becomes more of a serious  arrow  nailed  in<br \/>the flank of Indonesia's  diplomacy,  Jakarta  multiplies  efforts  to  gain<br \/>votes amongst countries who normally vote against in  the  sessions  of  UN,<br \/>the mediator of the discussions  between  Portugal  and  Indonesia  (without<br \/>Timorese representation) to avoid further embarrassments that have  resulted<br \/>uncomfortable  for  its  economic  relations,  and  desirable  leading  role<br \/>amongst the Non-Aligned Movement, the same that combated colonialism.<br \/>      Nevertheless the same policy  persists  for  Timor.  As  if  once  the<br \/>annexation has been  carried  out  it  urges  by  all  means  to  prove  the<br \/>righteousness of such action.<br \/>      For the last 19 years, an excess of 200 000 Timorese have been  killed<br \/>by the Indonesians. The Resistance arms itself  with  the  weapons  captured<br \/>from the enemy. Women, the aged and the children are concentrated  in  camps<br \/>where they  do  forced  labour  and  many  starve  to  death.  Suspects  are<br \/>tortured, spanking and sexual abuse  are  constant,  many  women  have  been<br \/>sterilized.  Family  members  are   deliberately   aparted.   Transmigration<br \/>programs project the definite dissolution of the Maubere People.<br \/><br \/><br \/>                Before and after the arrival of the Europeans<br \/><br \/><br \/>      Previous to the European interference  in  the  indigenous  scheme  of<br \/>life, the island of Timor was inhabited by barbarian  people  that  couldn't<br \/>write but used iron and was already agricultural. Industry  was  limited  to<br \/>the fabrication of cotton cloths with which they covered themselves and  the<br \/>commerce reduced to the trade of wax and  sandalwood  for  certain  products<br \/>that brought to Timor makasare, malays and javanese.<br \/>      Much before the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch, Timor was part of the<br \/>commercial nets politically centered east of Java,  after  in  the  Celebes,<br \/>and linked by trade to China and India. In documents  published  during  the<br \/>Ming dynasty, in 1436, the commercial value of Timor is put  in  relief  and<br \/>described  as  a  place  where  \u201cthe  mountains  are  covered  by  trees  of<br \/>sandalwood producing the country nothing else\u201d. One of the first  Portuguese<br \/>to visit the island, Duarte Barbosa, wrote in 1518:  \u201cthere's  an  abundance<br \/>of sandalwood, white, to which the Muslims in India and  Persia  give  great<br \/>value and where much of it is used\u201d.<br \/>      Other products were exported such as honey, wax and slaves, but  trade<br \/>relied mainly on sandalwood.<br \/><br \/><br \/>                   Japanese occupation during World War II<br \/><br \/><br \/>      During the Second World War, Portugal declared a policy of neutrality.<br \/>Dutch and  Australian  troops  nonetheless  disembarked  at  East  Timor  in<br \/>disrespect of Portuguese sovereignty. But the  real  menace  came  with  the<br \/>Japanese invasion, three months later,  in  February  of  1942.  The  island<br \/>became a stage of war between Japanese and the allieds. Timorese  were  seen<br \/>as secondary actors when in truth, after  crossing  a  period  of  rebellion<br \/>against  Portuguese  rule,  were  they  the  more  sacrificed   during   the<br \/>resistance until 1945.<br \/>      In spite of Portugal's policy of neutrality, the Australian and  Dutch<br \/>troops entered in  Timor.  It  was  the  first  of  two  foreigner  military<br \/>invasions. In Lisbon, Oliveira de Salazar denounced the allied disembark  as<br \/>an invasion of a neutral territory.  Shortly  after  arrived  the  Japanese.<br \/>It's not to admire that J. Santos Carvalho saw in these actions an  attitude<br \/>of depreciation towards the sovereignty of Portugal. When the allied  forces<br \/>arrived at Dili in  December  the  17th  of  1941,  he  says  that  governor<br \/>Ferreira de Carvalho,  without  means  to  retaliate  by  arms  ordered  the<br \/>national flag to be hoisted in all public partitions and  buildings  of  the<br \/>colony. To further mark his position of neutrality he  confined  himself  to<br \/>his residence and, by free determination, wished to be considered prisoner.<br \/>      The population of the capital went to live in the interior, mainly  in<br \/>Aileu, Liquie and Maubara. Some of the few Portuguese that remained in  Dili<br \/>pursued nevertheless with their usual lives,  socializing  with  the  forces<br \/>stationed in Timor. They were given instructions by the local government  to<br \/>maintain  a  correct  attitude  but  to  show  no  familiarity  neither   to<br \/>collaborate. An atmosphere of normality gain form, and  some  families  were<br \/>prepared to go back. It  is  even  reported  that  an  agreement  signed  by<br \/>English and Portuguese governments defined  that  the  allied  troops  would<br \/>retire as soon as arrived a contingent  of  Portuguese  forces  from  Maputo<br \/>(Mozambique).<br \/>      What happened instead was the Japanese invasion of Dili,  in  February<br \/>of 1942.  During  January  they  had  managed  to  occupy  Malaysia  (except<br \/>Singapore), the Philippines  (but  not  Bataan),  Borneo  and  the  Celebes,<br \/>Birmania, New Guinea  and  the  Salmon  islands.  Following  general  L.  M.<br \/>Chassin - \u201cat the end of the second month of an hyperbolic  invasion  ,  the<br \/>Japanese tide extended itself irresistibly  beyond  paralyzed  and  impotent<br \/>adversaries.\u201d In the middle  of  February  they  invaded  Sumatra  occupying<br \/>Palembang, soon after Singapore is attacked and  many  Englishmen  are  made<br \/>prisoners. Java was surrounded and on the 20th, Bali and Timor  were  taken.<br \/>After a weak resistance  ,  the  Dutch  troops  abandoned  by  the  Javanese<br \/>soldiers -- which were in majority  --,  escaped  to  the  interior  leaving<br \/>behind armament. Dili was then violently sacked by the Japanese,  who  found<br \/>the city almost uninhabited.<br \/><br \/><br \/>                       The Portuguese colonial empire<br \/><br \/><br \/>      Up to the final years of dictatorship in Portugal,  in  spite  of  the<br \/>condemnation of UN and the start of the guerrilla  warfare  in  the  African<br \/>colonies of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, the  Portuguese  Colonial  Empire<br \/>was defended by the government as an  heritage  of  the  glorious  past  and<br \/>motive  of  national  pride.  However,  the  crescent   expenses   of   it's<br \/>maintenance begun to reflect increasingly on the economy and  social  tissue<br \/>of the metropolis, what provoked crescent discontentment of the  population,<br \/>finally leading to the Revolution of '74 that installed democracy  and  gave<br \/>independence to the colonies. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia  precisely<br \/>in the course of decolonization.<br \/>      During  dictatorship,  the  colonies   continued   to   be   dedicated<br \/>considerable interest. For the nationalist ideology that  characterized  the<br \/>regime, the vast regions of the World under Portuguese sovereignty  were  to<br \/>be seen as the justification of a  necessary  conscience  of  greatness  and<br \/>pride to be Portuguese.<br \/>      The expression \"Portuguese Colonial Empire\" would be  generalized  and<br \/>even met official formalization. Colonial patrimony was  considered  as  the<br \/>remaining spoils of the Portuguese  conquests  of  the  glorious  period  of<br \/>expansion.<br \/>      These notions were mystified but also expressed  in  Law  as  in  1930<br \/>Oliveira de Salazar (at the time minister of Finances and, for some time  of<br \/>the Colonies)  published  the  Colonial  Act.  It  stated  some  fundamental<br \/>principles for the overseas territorial administration and  proclaimed  that<br \/>it was \u201cof the organic essence of  the  Portuguese  nation  to  possess  and<br \/>colonize overseas territories and to civilize indigenous  populations  there<br \/>comprised\u201d. The overseas dimension of  Portugal  was  however  soon  put  at<br \/>stake after World War II. The converging  interest  of  the  two  victorious<br \/>superpowers on the  re-distribution  of  World  regions  productors  of  raw<br \/>materials contributed for an international agreement on the legal right  for<br \/>all peoples to their own government. Stated as a  fundamental  principle  of<br \/>the UN Charter, anti-colonialism gave thrust to  the  independist  movements<br \/>of the colonies, and in matter of time unavoidably  accepted  by  the  great<br \/>colonial nations: England, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Yet such  countries<br \/>relied on mechanisms of economical  domination  that  would  last,  assuring<br \/>that political independence wouldn't substantially affect the  structure  of<br \/>trade relations.<br \/>      Loss of the Indian territories and the reactions.  The  first  problem<br \/>that the Portuguese had to deal  with  was  the  conflict  with  the  Indian<br \/>Union, independent state in 1947. The Indian nationalism had triumphed  over<br \/>the English occupation, and in 1956  forced  the  French  to  abandon  their<br \/>establishments in 1956. The same was demanded to the Portuguese  over  their<br \/>territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, but in face  of  refusal.  India  severed<br \/>the diplomatic relations. The passage through Indian territory in  order  to<br \/>reach the two enclaves  dependent  of  Daman  was  denied  since  1954,  and<br \/>despite the recognition of such right  by  International  Court  of  Justice<br \/>recognized t (1960), Dadr\u0431 and Nagar Haveli were effectively lost. This  was<br \/>followed by mass invasions of passive resisters which Portuguese were  still<br \/>able to hinder until December  19  of  1961,  when  the  Indian  Union  made<br \/>prevail it's superior  military  force,  to  obtain  final  retreat  of  the<br \/>Portuguese.<br \/>      Goa had  been  capital  of  the  Portuguese  expansion  to  the  East.<br \/>Conquered in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, it was also an active center  of<br \/>religious diffusion to the point of being called the Rome of the Orient.  In<br \/>spite of  it's  the  historical  and  spiritual  importance,  the  reactions<br \/>against the military attack of the Indian Union parted mainly from  official<br \/>sectors,  and  only  moderately  shared  by  the  public  opinion.  For  the<br \/>historian J. Hermano de Saraiva whom we  have  followed,  it  reflected  the<br \/>dominant  politic  ideologies:  at  the  end  of  the  XIXth  century,   the<br \/>colonizing activity was considered a service rendered  to  civilization  but<br \/>since World War II viewed as an attempt to the liberty of the peoples.  This<br \/>\u201cdoctrinal involucre of interest to which  the  Portuguese  were  completely<br \/>strange was rapidly adopted  by  the  intellectual  groups,  in  great  part<br \/>responsible for the formation of the public  opinion\u201d.  That's  how  Saraiva<br \/>justifies that the protests for the loss of Goa to  the  Indian  Union  were<br \/>directed less to the foreign power than to the Portuguese authorities,  \u201cfor<br \/>not having known to negotiate a modus viviendi acceptable for  both  parts\u201d.<br \/>More than that, he detects in this curious reaction a  tendency  that  would<br \/>accentuate along the two following decades: the  crisis  of  patriotism.  To<br \/>defend or to exalt the national values appeared to the bourgeois  elites  of<br \/>the  60's  as  a  provincial  attitude,  expression   of   cultural   under-<br \/>development.<br \/><br \/><br \/>                             Indonesian invasion<br \/><br \/>      Indonesia invaded the  territory  in  December  1975,  relying  on  US<br \/>diplomatic support and arms, used illegally but  with  secret  authorisation<br \/>from Washington; new  arms  shipments  were  sent  under  the  cover  of  an<br \/>official \"embargo\".<br \/>      There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would have<br \/>sufficed for the US and its allies  to  withdraw  active  participation  and<br \/>inform  their  associates  in  the  Indonesian  military  command  that  the<br \/>atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right  of  self-<br \/>determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the  international  court<br \/>of justice. \u201cWe cannot undo the past, but should  at  least  be  willing  to<br \/>recognise what we have done, and face the  moral  responsibility  of  saving<br \/>the remnants and providing reparations\u201d - a small  gesture  of  compensation<br \/>for terrible crimes.<br \/>      Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down to<br \/>the ground. Others run to the mountains in the  heart  of  their  land,  and<br \/>organized a resistance movement. These brave peasants -  and  their  sons  -<br \/>have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23  years  now.  Torture,<br \/>rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and  psychological  violations,  violent<br \/>repression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere  people<br \/>(the original people of East Timor) since.<br \/>      Even before president Habibie's surprise call for  a  referendum  this<br \/>year, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its  control  over<br \/>East Timor's resources, and undertook careful planning with \"the aim,  quite<br \/>simply... to destroy a nation\".<br \/>      The plans were known  to  western  intelligence.  The  army  recruited<br \/>thousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More  ominously,<br \/>the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained  Kopassus  special<br \/>forces and, as  senior  military  adviser,  General  Makarim,  a  US-trained<br \/>intelligence specialist with \"a reputation for callous violence\".<br \/>      Terror and destruction began  early  in  the  year.  The  army  forces<br \/>responsible have been described as \"rogue elements\" in the  west.  There  is<br \/>good  reason,  however,  to  accept  Bishop  Belo's  assignment  of   direct<br \/>responsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the  militias  have  been<br \/>managed by elite units of Kopassus, the \"crack  special  forces  unit\"  that<br \/>had \"been training regularly with  US  and  Australian  forces  until  their<br \/>behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends\".<br \/>      These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix  programme  in  the<br \/>Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of  peasants  and  much  of  the<br \/>indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as \"the tactics employed  by<br \/>the Contras\" in Nicaragua. The  state  terrorists  were  \"not  simply  going<br \/>after the most radical pro-independence people, but...  the  moderates,  the<br \/>people who have influence in their community.\"<br \/>      Well before the referendum, the commander of the  Indonesian  military<br \/>in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to  come:  \"If  the  pro-<br \/>independents do win... all will be destroyed.  It  will  be  worse  than  23<br \/>years ago\". An army document of early May, when international  agreement  on<br \/>the referendum was reached, ordered \"massacres should be  carried  out  from<br \/>village to village  after  the  announcement  of  the  ballot  if  the  pro-<br \/>independence  supporters  win\".  The  independence   movement   \"should   be<br \/>eliminated from its leadership down to its roots\".<br \/>      Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources,  the  Australian  press<br \/>reported that \"hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and  mortars  are<br \/>being stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is  rejected  at  the<br \/>ballot box\".<br \/>      All of this was understood by Indonesia's \"foreign friends\", who  also<br \/>knew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and  ambiguous<br \/>reactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret  as  a  \"green<br \/>light\" to carry out their work.<br \/>      The sordid history must  be  viewed  against  the  background  of  US-<br \/>Indonesia  relations  in  the  postwar  era.  The  rich  resources  of   the<br \/>archipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed  it  a  central<br \/>role in US global planning. These factors lie behind  US  efforts  40  years<br \/>ago to dismantle Indonesia, perceived as too independent and too  democratic<br \/>- even permitting participation of the poor peasants. These factors  account<br \/>for western support for the regime of  killers  and  torturers  who  emerged<br \/>from the 1965 coup.<br \/>      Their achievements were seen as a vindication of Washington's wars  in<br \/>Indochina,  motivated  in  large  part  by  concerns  that  the  \"virus\"  of<br \/>independent nationalism might  \"infect\"  Indonesia,  to  use  Kissinger-like<br \/>rhetoric.<br \/>      The recent convulsions inside Indonesia  -  with  its  people  finally<br \/>crying for freedom and democracy - and the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  of  1996  -<br \/>shared between Bishop Belo, a dominican supporting  the  Maubere  people  in<br \/>Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, a politician and  activist  who  represents  the<br \/>Resistance historic leader, Xanana Gusmao, imprisioned in  Indonesia  for  a<br \/>20-year sentence - have brought a new hope  to  the  fight  of  this  martyr<br \/>people. Also,  economic  crisis  hitting  south-east  Asia  has  shaken  the<br \/>dictatorship in  Jakarta  more  than  ever.  The  winds  of  change  blowing<br \/>throughout Indonesia  started to hit East Timor...<br \/><br \/><br \/>                          Introduction to Indonesia<br \/><br \/>      Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the  world  which<br \/>means 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part  of<br \/>the declared Muslims mix their faith  in  Allah  with  animistic  or  Hindu-<br \/>Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the  Indian  colonization  that<br \/>would be interrupted with the penetration of  Islam  in  the  16th  century,<br \/>generally superficial and incomplete.<br \/>      Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677  islands,  3  000<br \/>inhabited, and with an approximate extension of 1\/8 the perimeter of  Earth,<br \/>Indonesia faces problems of national unity. Being the  fifth  most  populous<br \/>nation, 2\/3 are concentrated in only the fifth larger  island,  Java,  where<br \/>the density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably  by  birth<br \/>control  and  transmigration  to  territories  such  as  Papua  New  Guinea,<br \/>recently East Timor  but  also  in  between  with  the  evident  purpose  of<br \/>dissolving local cultures in the predominant  Javanese  which  is  only  one<br \/>amongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than  250  different<br \/>languages and dialects.<br \/>      The Dutch colonial domain had been massively based in Java,  with  the<br \/>rest of the  archipelago  had  developed  very  unequally.  From  the  rigid<br \/>Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes  of  Borneo  or  the  Christian<br \/>islands of the east, a variety of economic and  social  systems  experienced<br \/>very distinct problems for their progress.<br \/><br \/><br \/>                    Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno<br \/><br \/>      At the time of  Indonesia's  proclamation  of  independence  in  1945,<br \/>President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state  --  the  \"Panca<br \/>sila\" (meaning \"five virtues\") -- to be followed by all citizens  and  sworn<br \/>by the social organizations. Main principles imposed were  the  adoption  of<br \/>Indonesian \"Bahasa\" language and the acceptance of one among five  religions<br \/>-- Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and  Buddhism  --  forbidding<br \/>the animist cults and other traditional practices.  Thus  \"Panca  sila\"  was<br \/>assumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize  the<br \/>diverse cultures.<br \/>      But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibility<br \/>of the creation of an  official  Islamic  state,  when  Suharto  reached  to<br \/>power,  Communist  administrators  and  Islamic  movements   supported   the<br \/>Revolution, but what they didn't expect was the minor  concessions  offered,<br \/>and once annihilated the Communist Party,  an  \u201cimportant  preoccupation  of<br \/>the government  has  been  to  control,  domesticate  or  destroy  the  most<br \/>orthodox and active Muslim factions\u201d (Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalh\u0433es,  Oporto<br \/>University). Since then they oftenly erupt in  riots  against  the  military<br \/>aristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.<br \/>      Besides reaffirming the \"Panca sila\", in 1982 Suharto  introduced  the<br \/>Law of  the  Associations  which  would  fasten  the  strain  on  political,<br \/>religious and  social  associations  as  it  increased  the  powers  of  the<br \/>administration to dismiss  or  impute  directors  to  the  aggregations,  to<br \/>destroy or agglutinate them in  others  more  vast  and  controlled  by  the<br \/>militaries.<br \/>      Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections  in<br \/>favor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with  the  killing<br \/>of 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of  former<br \/>governors that defied an inquiry to the incident.<br \/>      Neo-colonialism in Indonesia? Many authors mention that Sukarno had  a<br \/>dream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising  the  totality  of  the<br \/>ancient Dutch East Indies,  inclusive  the  non-Indonesian  population.  For<br \/>this reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially  conceived<br \/>for the creation of the United States of Indonesia  --  thus  betraying  the<br \/>agreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty --, in favor of  an<br \/>unitary constitution, although still  provisional.  The  new  direction  was<br \/>taken in August of 1950, three months after  an  unilateral  declaration  of<br \/>independence by the South Moluccas.<br \/>      The first elections, free and democratic in fact,  would  be  held  in<br \/>1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences  naturally<br \/>brought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary  democracy.  On<br \/>one hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of  the  \"Nahdatul<br \/>Ulama\" (NU) and  the  orthodox  Moslems  of  the  \"Masyumi\",  which's  vital<br \/>strength came from the outside -- West Sumatra  and  North  Celebes  besides<br \/>Occidental Java (Sundanese ethnic origin). On the other  hand,  between  the<br \/>Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based  in  Java,  and<br \/>these with the Moslems.<br \/>      The inefficiency of the administration,  which  passed  through  seven<br \/>governments since 1949 to '57,  and  the  rivalry  engaged  by  the  parties<br \/>alone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th,  after<br \/>all, the concentration of decision and power in Java as  restrictor  of  the<br \/>economic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in  the<br \/>exterior islands.<br \/>      In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal  democracy<br \/>because unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He  interfered  more  in  the<br \/>constitutional processes and appeals to his concept of  \"Guided  Democracy\",<br \/>founded on indigenous procedures: the important questions should be  decided<br \/>through prolonged deliberations (\"musyawarah\") in order to obtain  consensus<br \/>(\"mukafat\"). This was the practice in the village and the same  model  ought<br \/>to be adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government  formed  by  the<br \/>four main  parties  and  a  national  council  represented  by  parties  and<br \/>functional groups in which, under the guidance of the  president  (himself),<br \/>consensus would express itself.<br \/>      In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father  of  the  country<br \/>and mentor of the principle \"unity in diversity\", he  was  unable  to  avoid<br \/>the proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response  to  the<br \/>regional dissidences which reached their peak.<br \/>      At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat of<br \/>a motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West  New<br \/>Guinea. In a series of direct actions across  the  country,  Dutch  property<br \/>was seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the  beginning  of<br \/>1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new  central  government<br \/>under the leadership of  Hatta,  a  moderate  and  historic  figure  of  the<br \/>Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years  ago<br \/>when he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal  of<br \/>the Sumatrese a  new  revolutionary  government  was  formed,  supported  by<br \/>leaders of the  Masyumi  Party,  including  the  ex-Prime  Ministers  Natsir<br \/>(September 1950 -- March '51) and Harahap (August '55  --  March  '56).  The<br \/>military commandant of the North Celebes joined  the  initiative,  yet  most<br \/>striking was CIA's assistance with armament including aircrafts.<br \/>      Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and with<br \/>the regions undermined, the parties discredited  and  the  prestige  of  the<br \/>victorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of  Guided  Democracy  in<br \/>partnership with the  military.  Meanwhile,  the  army  chief  of  staff  A.<br \/>Nasution had committed himself  to  the  thought  that  the  return  to  the<br \/>revolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the  best<br \/>means  for  implementing  the  principles  of  deliberation,  consensus  and<br \/>functional representation. Sukarno urged this course  in  a  speech  to  the<br \/>Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to  draft  a  permanent  constitution.<br \/>Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds  for  majority,  he<br \/>introduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.<br \/>      Indonesia's domestic as well as  foreign  diplomacy  is  difficult  to<br \/>conceive  in  terms  other  than  in  the  context  of  neo-colonialism.  It<br \/>certainly is incompatible with the spirit of the  Afro-Asian  Conference  of<br \/>Bandung held in Java, in 1955. Among twenty  nine  countries  consensus  was<br \/>reached  in  order  to  condemn  colonialism   \u201cin   all   it's   forms   of<br \/>manifestation\u201d. As it seems,  imperialism  isn't  condemnable  so  long  the<br \/>territories comes from  an  ancient  colony.  Like  the  annexation  of  the<br \/>Moluccan islands (1950-52) and in  1969  the  also  former  Dutch  West  New<br \/>Guinea, long pretended. The last was integrated after an Act of Free  Choice<br \/>sanctioned by UN. In truth, many journalists and  observers  would  consider<br \/>the process orchestrated but  it  had  already  been  sealed.  Today  it  is<br \/>remembered as perhaps the most unfortunate episode UN's history.<br \/>      In both  regions,  as  well  as  in  other  islands  of  the  Pacific,<br \/>population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not  identifying  themselves  with<br \/>Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.<br \/>      The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From the<br \/>perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in  the<br \/>district of Acheh, a Moslem state practically  subsisted  between  1948  and<br \/>1962), Sumatra and Celebes as we've  seen  but  also  Kalimantan,  to  those<br \/>involving Christian groups as in the  South  Moluccas.  Still  in  1984  the<br \/>Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in  attacks  against  the  main<br \/>cities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to  the<br \/>Regional Parliament.<br \/>      The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the  preservation  of<br \/>the equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI).  The  period<br \/>assisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the  consistent<br \/>protection moved  by  the  President  in  face  of  the  incursions  of  the<br \/>militaries. he opposed to the prohibitions  of  congresses  and  editorials,<br \/>banished political organizations patronized by the military to  blacken  the<br \/>PKI, placing some of their  militants  in  political  posts.  Many  analysts<br \/>think that Sukarno was preparing the path for the rise of the communists  to<br \/>the power. Others say that his action intended to assure a  the  permanently<br \/>threatened equilibrium<br \/>      The coup of Suharto and the military. On the night  of  September  30,<br \/>1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim  Air  Base  attempted  a<br \/>coup d'\u0439tat to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over  of  a  pro-<br \/>Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic  Reserve<br \/>of the  Army  Forces  (KOSTRAD),  commanded  by  Suharto,  had  concluded  a<br \/>successful counter-attack. For  specialist  Benedict  Anderson,  of  Cornell<br \/>University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins  of  power<br \/>into his hands, hadn't been aimed at by the  \"30th  of  September  Movement\"<br \/>which  assassinated  six  army  generals  (while  a  seventh,  A.  Nasution,<br \/>escaped).<br \/>      With propaganda that implicated important  nationalist  and  communist<br \/>politicians in the first stroke and the estimulation of  the  widely  spread<br \/>resentment of the  pro-Chinese  PKI  was  object  of  among  the  Indonesian<br \/>Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed  power.  Suharto  begun  to<br \/>maintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional  presidency,<br \/>as a symbol of national unity until by decree emptying his legal  authority,<br \/>in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for  more  than  half  a<br \/>million Chinese and Indonesian besides an excess of 200  thousand  political<br \/>prisoners which altogether formed one of the greatest Communist  parties  of<br \/>the World. The wave of hysteria was such that  they  were  pointed  out  and<br \/>oftenly even executed by their proper neighbor civilians in the villages.<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>              Formation of East-Timorese political associations<br \/><br \/>      During Portuguese dictatorship, civilians were  prohibited  to  gather<br \/>for political discussions.  But  since  the  60's  an  educated  elite  with<br \/>nationalist aspirations  begun  to  reune  clandistinely  and  vehicle  some<br \/>principles in catholic press. Three weeks after the  democratic  Revolution,<br \/>formation of political associations was  incentivated,  in  the  process  of<br \/>decolonization. Immediatly UDT was founded, wanting  to  prolong  Portugal's<br \/>presence in view of a progressive autonomy. ASDT,  future  Fretilin,  called<br \/>for radical independence, while Apodeti, supported  by  Indonesia,  for  the<br \/>integration of East Timor in the neighbour power.<br \/>      Although the changes acrossing the metropolis were of little immediate<br \/>effect in the rural society, they had profound impact among  the  elites  of<br \/>East Timor, particularly in  the  administrator  sectors,  centered  in  the<br \/>cities and specially in  Dili  They  polarized  the  opposition  to  certain<br \/>aspects of the Portuguese rule.<br \/>      Since the 60s, an educated elite with nationalist aspirations began to<br \/>emerge, often product of the catholic  schools  and  particularly  from  the<br \/>seminaries of Dare (outside Dili) and  S.  Jose  in  the  colony  of  Macao.<br \/>Discussions involved  small  groups  of  students  and  administrators  that<br \/>gathered clandestinely in the capital. The main escapes of their ideas  were<br \/>catholic publications of reduced circulation like Seara,  which  was  closed<br \/>down by the political police PIDE.<br \/>      The conclusions reached are considered general and  vagrant.  Subjects<br \/>like traditional marriage and the educational system were  debated  but  not<br \/>much was proposed as a global critic and alternatives.<br \/>      Anyhow, this collective of  student-administrators  and  higher  level<br \/>bureaucrats, as well as important rural  proprietors  would  constitute  the<br \/>basis of the two main political parties: UDT and ASDT\/Fretilin.<br \/>      Three weeks after the Revolution 25th of April, the Governor  of  East<br \/>Timor created the Commission for the  Autodetermination  which's  intentions<br \/>were to bring out to legality all the incipient political associations.<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>                                 The parties<br \/><br \/>      UDT (Timor Democratic Union). This became the first  party,  was  also<br \/>the most popular for some months. The  initial  declaration,  of  May  11th,<br \/>made apology of democratic principles, distribution  of  revenues  and,  the<br \/>fulcral aspect, a  progressive  autonomy  materialized  with  an  increasing<br \/>participation of the Timorese but always in  the  light  of  the  Portuguese<br \/>flag, to culminate with the  integration  of  East  Timor  in  a  Portuguese<br \/>language community. The political platform as conceived by  first  president<br \/>M\u0431rio Carrascal\u0433o was  to  hold  Portugal's  presence  as  far  as  possible<br \/>without putting aside the  option  for  independence.  But  although  having<br \/>presented a cohesive front at start, the course  of  events  in  the  months<br \/>followed would evidence different susceptibilities towards a same problem.<br \/>      Firmly based on two groups, the higher positioned administrator  elite<br \/>and the larger proprietors of coffee plantations. UDT  accounted  still  the<br \/>favours of many suco liurais, although the majority  of  these  belonged  to<br \/>the circle of the imposed chiefs, in an ancient  practice  of  the  colonial<br \/>government to substitute the legitimate when  less  malleable...  They  used<br \/>their influence to gain support for the party in  the  countryside  managing<br \/>strong  implantation  in  areas  like  Liquie,  Maubara,  Maubisse,  Ainaro,<br \/>Manatuto, Laclubar.<br \/>      While a group of conservatives were  granted  support  by  traditional<br \/>chiefs  and  administrators  --  whose  positions   and   privileges   under<br \/>Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the  metropolis  --,<br \/>those with commercial preoccupations of  economical  diversification  beyond<br \/>the Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence.<br \/>      Not until 27  of  July  did  the  MFA  in  Lisbon  determine  the  new<br \/>orientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it,  the  Timorese<br \/>were officially and for the first time confronted with  the  possibility  of<br \/>independence.<br \/>      In a message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about the<br \/>viability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained.  Few  days<br \/>later,   UDT   published   the   provisional   statutes   where   preconized<br \/>autodetermination  oriented   to   federation   with   Portugal,   with   an<br \/>intermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting  integration<br \/>in any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement  of<br \/>a definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of  independence<br \/>that blew from the ancient  metropolis.  Spreading  throughout  the  African<br \/>colonies,  in  East  Timor  it  influenced  a  crescent  opposing  party  of<br \/>independist militancy that defied UDT's hesitations: ASDT.<br \/>      Amongst UDT founders pontificated  the  mentioned  Mario  Carrascal\u0433o,<br \/>proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services,  and<br \/>also former leader of caetanist party ANP  (Popular  National  Association),<br \/>the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP  member  and<br \/>director of Timor's journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by  the  government.<br \/>He and intellectual  Domingos  de  Oliveira  were  custom  officials.  Cesar<br \/>Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili.<br \/>      ASDT\/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of  Independent  East  Timor).  The<br \/>plan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it's foundation, 20th  of<br \/>May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and  democracy  it  called  upfront<br \/>for a gradual independence preceded  of  administrator,  economical,  social<br \/>and political reforms. Three to eight years was  the  period  of  transition<br \/>considered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation  of  the<br \/>Timorese in the administration.<br \/>      In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members of<br \/>the urbane elites, mainly those living in D\u043dli, which  maintained  the  link<br \/>to the rural areas of where they came from. Some were  even  descendants  of<br \/>liurai families.<br \/>      With an average age under 30, the  elder  Xavier  do  Amaral,  of  37,<br \/>became ASDT's  chairman.  The  leaders  were  commited  to  nationalism  and<br \/>reaffirmation  of  the  Timorese  culture,  agreed  on   the   priority   of<br \/>agricultural  development,   on   alphabetization   and   extensive   health<br \/>programmes.  But  furthermore,  the  political  perspectives  deferred.  The<br \/>dominating tendency  between  the  founders  of  ASDT  was  clearly  social-<br \/>democratic, represented by men like  journalist  Ramos-Horta,  administrator<br \/>Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota  and  former  professor  Xavier  do  Amaral.<br \/>Ramos-Horta says that  for  him  and  the  majority  of  his  colleagues  it<br \/>represented  social  justice,  equitative  distribution  of  the   country's<br \/>wealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended  democratic<br \/>liberties. As to what extent did they have  a  model,  sociologist  John  G.<br \/>Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the  60  and  70's  in  Austria  and<br \/>Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn't experimented, as the urgency to gain  internal<br \/>and foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity.<br \/>      Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current  leaded  by  ancient<br \/>sergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, \u201ccombined  a<br \/>fervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of  economical  and  political<br \/>development  self-reliance  based  upon  the  experiences  of   Angola   and<br \/>Mozambique\u201d. His ideas would begin to prevail after  the  transformation  of<br \/>ASDT into FRETILIN.<br \/>      Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association).  In  25  of  May  a<br \/>third  party  appeared  under  the  designation  of  Association   for   the<br \/>Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti,  the  manifesto  of  the<br \/>party defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia  in<br \/>accordance to the International Law and principles such  as  the  obligatory<br \/>teaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education  and<br \/>medical assistance, and the right to go on strike.<br \/>      The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the  assumption  that  Portugal<br \/>would abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn't stand  a<br \/>chance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in  a<br \/>process of integration appeared more as a popular  measure  and  than  as  a<br \/>political stand.<br \/>      It has been written that in the beginning of the 60's, BAKIN (military<br \/>co-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence  INTEL),  mounted  a  net  in<br \/>East Timor which  dealed  with  merchants,  custom-house  functionaries  and<br \/>agents from  the  Indonesian  consulate  of  Dili,  in  change  of  favours,<br \/>payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would  become<br \/>the  prominent  leaders  of  Apodeti:  professor  and  administrator  Os\u0443rio<br \/>Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of  Indonesian  Timor)  Guilherme<br \/>Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo.<br \/>      Still before  the  Portuguese  Revolution,  BAKIN  had  trained  East-<br \/>timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters.<br \/>      Nevertheless, while UDT  and  ASDT\/Fretilin  rapidly  reached  to  the<br \/>thousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn't reach more than a couple  of  hundreds<br \/>during the whole year of '74.<br \/>      The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small<br \/>Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had  no  expression.  The  dubious<br \/>personalities of it's leaders, all with criminal record and their  political<br \/>purposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor's last governor,  J.  Lemos<br \/>Pires \u201can enclosed organization, with  difficulties  to  dialogue  with  the<br \/>people and government  even  worse  with  the  opponent  parties\u201d.  Fretilin<br \/>considered Apodeti illegal.<br \/>      Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA<br \/>(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning \"sons  of  the  mountain  warriors\",  was<br \/>filiated in the Popular Monarchical  Party  of  the  metropolis.  Remounting<br \/>it's  origins  to  the  Topasses  (see  Ethnology  of  the  Timorese),  KOTA<br \/>postulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who  could  trace  their<br \/>ancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a  democratic<br \/>monarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais.  Like  KOTA,  the<br \/>Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn't a  programme  and  agrouped  only<br \/>eight members, all from  the  same  family.  They  wished  to  mobilize  the<br \/>working class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East  Timor<br \/>in Australia received money for promises of integration in  Australia.  It's<br \/>existence was ephemerous because the  Australian  government  departed  from<br \/>the idea even before the end of 1974.<br \/>      Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned and<br \/>precisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke  that<br \/>four of the five parties, which they alleged that was the  majority  of  the<br \/>East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War<br \/>      On 15  September  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  unanimously<br \/>authorised the establishment  of  a  multinational  force  in  Timor  (UNSCR<br \/>1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for  its  mandate:  first,<br \/>to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect  and  support<br \/>the United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third,  to  facilitate  within<br \/>force capabilities humanitarian assistance operations  in  East  Timor.  The<br \/>multinational  force  is  commanded  by  Australia\u2019s  Major  General   Peter<br \/>Cosgrove<br \/><br \/><br \/>                             Australian support<br \/><br \/>      The multinational force has been  authorised  by  the  United  Nations<br \/>Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations  Charter,  to  use<br \/>all necessary measures to  achieve  its  mandate.  The  multinational  force<br \/>would prepare the ground for the United Nations  to  complete  its  task  of<br \/>managing East Timor's transition to  independence.  This  will  involve  the<br \/>arrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet  UN  peacekeeping<br \/>operation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration.<br \/>      Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new  \u2013<br \/>Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But  the  East  Timor  operation  \u2013<br \/>multilateral in  scope,  strongly  representing  South  East  Asia,  led  by<br \/>Australia and  conducted  under  a  United  Nations  Chapter  VII  or  peace<br \/>enforcement mandate \u2013 is of a very different nature. This is the first  time<br \/>that Australia has been asked by the United Nations  to  build  and  lead  a<br \/>multinational force and  to  provide  the  largest  single  component.  When<br \/>Australia\u2019s deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops.<br \/>      Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is  not  motivated  by<br \/>any  desire  to  cause  difficulties  in  relations  between  Australia  and<br \/>Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor  at  the  request<br \/>of the United Nations and with the agreement of the  Indonesian  Government.<br \/>It was in Australia\u2019s vital interests that Indonesia be a  peaceful,  stable<br \/>and democratic state, economically prosperous  and  playing  a  leading  and<br \/>respected role in the region. It was also in Indonesia\u2019s  own  interests  to<br \/>ensure East Timor\u2019s transition is a peaceful and  orderly  one.  Australia\u2019s<br \/>efforts in building the relations  with  Indonesia  were  directed  to  that<br \/>outcome.<br \/>      With respect to  defence  relations,  it  is  in  australian  security<br \/>interests to have links such as defence attache  representation,  high-level<br \/>strategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance  and  disaster<br \/>relief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the  objectives  in<br \/>East Timor, and are desirable because defence links  will  be  part  of  any<br \/>effective long-term relationship with Indonesia.  That  decision  shows  the<br \/>challenges Jakarta and  Canberra  face  in  maintaining  a  working  defence<br \/>relationship that supports the long-term national  and  strategic  interests<br \/>of both countries.<br \/>      Prime Minister Howard has said  that  \u201cthe  deployment  of  Australian<br \/>troops to East Timor meets the test of national interest  in  two  respects.<br \/>First, in the spirit of Australia's military tradition, troops are going  to<br \/>defend what Australian society believes to be  right.  The  troops  are  not<br \/>going to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others  or  to<br \/>act against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go  to<br \/>East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with  the  agreement  of<br \/>the Indonesian  government.  INTERFET  troops  are  defending  East  Timor\u2019s<br \/>desire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by  the<br \/>Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international  community.<br \/>In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the  humanitarian  relief  that<br \/>is so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of  displaced  people<br \/>in East Timor.<br \/>      Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to the<br \/>terrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the  ballot<br \/>was announced.  Apart  from  the  human  cost,  the  scale  of  violence  we<br \/>witnessed undermines Australia's  own  interest  in  a  stable  region.  The<br \/>troops will prepare the way for the United Nations to  undertake  the  vital<br \/>task of developing a transitional  political  and  administrative  framework<br \/>for East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the  hope  of  reconciliation<br \/>among groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity  to<br \/>create their own future. They have a responsibility to come  to  grips  with<br \/>these issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate  on<br \/>its nation building  task,  with  the  full  support  of  the  international<br \/>community.\u201d<br \/><br \/><br \/>               USA admits Timorese right to self-determination<br \/><br \/>      On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold,  dated  December  27th,  1996,<br \/>U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that  he  \"noted<br \/>with interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of  a  UN-sponsored<br \/>self-determination referendum in East Timor\".<br \/><br \/><br \/>                        Indonesia admits independence<br \/><br \/>      For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted  the  right  of<br \/>the Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another  high-<br \/>level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese  and  Indonesian<br \/>Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations' headquarters  in  New  Yourk,  the<br \/>Indonesian authorities  stated  that  if  the  East  Timorese  rejected  the<br \/>current authonomy plan offered  by  Indonesia,  the  central  government  in<br \/>Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors.<br \/>      Only a couple of weeks later, president B.J. Habibie announced,  at  a<br \/>meeting with indonesian businessmen at the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  that  by<br \/>January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would  be  'fixed':  either  the<br \/>Timorese accepted the \"large-scale authonomy\"  proposed  by  the  Indonesian<br \/>government in New York (August 5th, 1998), or  Indonesia  \"would  wave  them<br \/>goodbye\". It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked  of<br \/>independence for East Timor.<br \/>      Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has  worsened  in  the  last<br \/>months,  followin  the  alleged  massacre  at  Alas  (south  of  Dili)  last<br \/>December, when as much as 52 people would have  been  killed.  The  military<br \/>(18,000 soldiers currently serve in the  occupied  territory,  according  to<br \/>intelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident  officer  -  that<br \/>is, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in  the<br \/>rest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what  international<br \/>observers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on  the  verge<br \/>of Indonesia's leave.<br \/><br \/>  Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on<br \/>                         the Question of East Timor<br \/>      The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General  Assembly<br \/>resolutions and the  relevant  resolutions  and  decisions  adopted  by  the<br \/>Security Council and the General Assembly on the  question  of  East  Timor;<br \/>bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments  of  Indonesia  and<br \/>Portugal since July  1983,  through  the  good  offices  of  the  Secretary-<br \/>General, to  find  a  just,  comprehensive  and  internationally  acceptable<br \/>solution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5  August<br \/>1998  to  undertake,  under   the   auspices   of   the   Secretary-General,<br \/>negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy  for  East<br \/>Timor without prejudice to the positions  of  principle  of  the  respective<br \/>Governments  on  the  final  status  of  East  Timor;  having  discussed   a<br \/>constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the  basis  of  a<br \/>draft presented  by  the  United  Nations,  as  amended  by  the  Indonesian<br \/>Government; noting the position of the  Government  of  Indonesia  that  the<br \/>proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end  solution  to<br \/>the question of East Timor with full recognition of  Indonesian  sovereignty<br \/>over East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal  that  an<br \/>autonomy  regime  should  be  transitional,  not  requiring  recognition  of<br \/>Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal  of  East  Timor  from<br \/>the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly,  pending<br \/>a final decision on the status of East Timor by  the  East  Timorese  people<br \/>through an act of self-determination under United Notions  auspices;  taking<br \/>into account that although the Governments of Indonesia  and  Portugal  each<br \/>have their positions of principle  on  the  prepared  proposal  for  special<br \/>autonomy, both agree  that  it  is  essential  to  move  the  peace  process<br \/>forward, and that therefore,  the  Governments  of  Indonesia  and  Portugal<br \/>agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people  on<br \/>the constitutional framework for  autonomy  attached  hereto  as  an  annex;<br \/>bearing in mind that the Governments of  Indonesia  and  Portugal  requested<br \/>the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures  for  the  popular<br \/>consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in  New<br \/>York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the  Agreement  Between  the  Republic  of<br \/>Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor<br \/><br \/>\u201cArticle 1 Request  the  Secretary-General  to  put  the  attached  proposed<br \/>constitutional framework providing for a special  autonomy  for  East  Timor<br \/>within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese  people,  both<br \/>inside and outside East Timor, for their  consideration  and  acceptance  or<br \/>rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of  a  direct,  secret<br \/>and universal ballot.<br \/><br \/>Article 2 Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after  the<br \/>signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United  Nations  mission  in  East<br \/>Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.<br \/><br \/>Article 3 The Government of Indonesia will be  responsible  for  maintaining<br \/>peace and security in East  Timor  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  popular<br \/>consultation is carried out in a fair and  peaceful  way  in  an  atmosphere<br \/>free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.<br \/><br \/>Article 4 Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the  popular<br \/>consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly,  as  well  as<br \/>to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and  the  East  Timorese<br \/>people.<br \/><br \/>Article 5 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis  of  the  result<br \/>of the popular consultation and in accordance  with  this  Agreement,  that,<br \/>the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable  to<br \/>the East Timorese people, the Government of  Indonesia  shall  initiate  the<br \/>constitutional  measures   necessary   for   the   implementation   of   the<br \/>constitutional framework, and the  Government  of  Portugal  shall  initiate<br \/>within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal  of  East<br \/>Timor from  the  list  of  Non-Self-Governing  Territories  of  the  General<br \/>Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas  of<br \/>the Security Council and the General Assembly.<br \/><br \/>Article 6 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis  of  the  result<br \/>of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that  the<br \/>proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable  to<br \/>the East Timorese  people,  the  Government  of  Indonesia  shall  take  the<br \/>constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East  Timor  thus<br \/>restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to  17  July<br \/>1976, and the Governments of  Indonesia  and  Portugal  and  the  Secretary-<br \/>General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly  transfer  of<br \/>authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General  shall,<br \/>subject to the  appropriate  legislative  mandate,  initiate  the  procedure<br \/>enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.<br \/><br \/>Article 7 During the interim period between the conclusion  of  the  popular<br \/>consultation and the start of  the  implementation  of  either  option,  the<br \/>parties  request  the  Secretary-General  to  maintain  an  adequate  United<br \/>Nations presence in East Timor. \u201c<br \/><br \/><br \/>                                 Conclusion<br \/><br \/>      On  August,  30th,  History  was  written  in  East  Timor:  98.6%  of<br \/>registered  voters  exercised  their  democratic  right  in  a  UN-organised<br \/>referendum, considered by the Indonesian authorities  as  \"free  and  fair\".<br \/>Defying eight months of intimidation by indonesian-armed militiamen,  mostly<br \/>transmigrated from West Timor, the population stood in long  queues  at  the<br \/>ballot sites,  in  some  cases  waiting  hours  in  the  sun  after  walking<br \/>kilometres to the nearest polling station.<br \/>      Hardly anybody partied  in  Dili,  though,  or  in  the  rest  of  the<br \/>territory; celebrations were held abroad, though,  in  Australia,  Portugal,<br \/>the United States, Ireland, England, Mozambique, even Indonesia, wherever  a<br \/>Timorese community is to be found. But inside  the  new  Nation,  just  four<br \/>hours after the official announcement, the defeated  militia  gangs  started<br \/>to set East Timor on fire. BBC, CNN, and  other  international  TV  stations<br \/>broadcasted to the world images once seen in other war scenarios -  fire  of<br \/>automatic weapons, houses set on fire, innocent  civilians  seeking  shelter<br \/>in the schools, the  churches,  the  neighbouring  mountains.  International<br \/>media reports mentioned 145 deaths in Dili only, in the 48  hours  following<br \/>the announcement. On September, 5th and 6th, most  international  observers,<br \/>journalists and the civilian personnel of UNAMET  were  evacuated  from  the<br \/>territory, either by chartered planes or the Australian Air  Force.  On  the<br \/>afternoon of September, the  5th,  four  indonesian  ministers  -  including<br \/>Defence and Foreign Affairs holders, General Wiranto and Mr.  Ali  Alatas  -<br \/>and one secretary of State paid a 4-hour visit to Dili - though  they  never<br \/>left the airport \"for security reasons\".<br \/>      On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered  on<br \/>an emergency meeting in New York, once more  abstained  from  sending  in  a<br \/>peace-keeping force. The  Indonesian  authorities  claimed  to  be  able  to<br \/>restore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already  stationed  in  the<br \/>territory failed to do  so  until  now,  and  were  even  reported  to  have<br \/>participated, in some cases directly, in the new mass  killings  started  on<br \/>September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence  from  UNAMET  staff  and<br \/>international media wasn't enough, so the Council decided to send  a  \"fact-<br \/>finding mission\" to Jakarta.<br \/>      On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of  Nobel  Peace  Prize<br \/>winner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in  Baucau,<br \/>though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees  in  his  frontyard,<br \/>now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like  so  many  before  them.<br \/>More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili,  and<br \/>the UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport.<br \/>      Despite several  United  Nations  Resolutions  on  the  right  of  the<br \/>Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized  the  indonesian<br \/>annexation of the territory), the international community has been blind  to<br \/>the fight of its inhabitants. Only since  November  12th,  1991,  when  more<br \/>than 250 youngsters were killed during  a  brutal  massacre  occurred  in  a<br \/>cematery in Dili (the capital city of  East  Timor),  have  the  \"civilized\"<br \/>nations  condemned  Indonesia  in  a  more  consistent  way.  But  words  of<br \/>condemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime  (a<br \/>dictatorship ruling Indonesia for  decades),  and  strengthen  the  economic<br \/>ties binding European and American states to Jakarta.<br \/>      The five days which mediated until  official  results  were  announced<br \/>were days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other  spots<br \/>in the territory. But on the  morning  of  September,  4th,  UNAMET  (United<br \/>Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian  Martin  announced  the<br \/>results, minutes after the United Nations'  Secretary-General,  Kofi  Annan,<br \/>had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept  the<br \/>Special  Autonomy  offered  to  the  territory  by   Indonesia,   while   an<br \/>overwhelming majority  of  78.5%  reffused  it,  thus  laying  the  path  to<br \/>independence.<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>                                 The sources<br \/><br \/><br \/> . Aditjondro, George J In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the<br \/>   Occupation of East Timor, The Netherlands, 1994<br \/><br \/> . Aubrey, Jim  Free East Timor \u2013 Australia\u2019s Culpability in East Timor\u2019s<br \/>   Genocide. Vintage \u2013 Random House Australia<br \/><br \/> . Carey, P &amp; GC Bentley East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a<br \/>   Nation, Cassell, NY, 1995<br \/><br \/> . CIIR\/IPJET International Law and the Question of East Timor, London, 1995<br \/><br \/><br \/> . Cox, Steve Generations of Resistance: East Timor, Cassell, UK, 1995<br \/><br \/> . Dunn, James 1. East Timor - the Balibo Incident in Perspective, Sydney,<br \/>   1995<br \/><br \/> . Timor: A People Betrayed , ABC Books, Sydney, 1996<br \/><br \/> . East Timor: No Solutions Without respect for Human Rights: Bi-Annual<br \/>   Report of Human Rights Violations, January to June 1998<br \/><br \/> . Violence by the State Against Women in East Timor: A Report to the UN<br \/>   Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Including its Clauses and<br \/>   Consequences<br \/><br \/> . East Timorese Political Prisoners<br \/><br \/> . Breaking the Cycle of Human Rights Violations in East Timor: Annual<br \/>   Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1997<br \/><br \/> . Hobart East Timor Committee Hobart East Timor Committee \u2013 Papers, 1998<br \/>   Jardine, Matthew<br \/><br \/> . Ramos Horta, Jose, International Perspectives on Children of War, Family<br \/>   and Conciliation Courts Review Vol 36 No 3 July 1998<br \/><br \/> . Salla, Michael E, Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict,<br \/>   Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 1997<br \/><br \/> . ETAN\/US - Pamphlets\/Reports NY,USA<br \/><br \/> . Indonesia and East Timor: On the verge of change? Charles Scheiner,<br \/>   Matthew Jardine &amp; Sidhawati ETAN, Global Exchange &amp; Justice for All,<br \/>   April 1998<br \/><br \/><\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>East Timor Independence? Contents. . Introduction \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 3 . Ethnological origin, demography and policy \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 3 . Before and after the arrival of the Europeans \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 6 . Japanese occupation during World War II \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20267 . The Portuguese colonial empire \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 8 . Indonesian invasion \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.. 10 . Introduction to Indonesia \u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026. 12 . Independence [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85219"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=85219"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85219\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=85219"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=85219"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=85219"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}