{"id":85163,"date":"2018-03-08T02:41:00","date_gmt":"2018-03-08T02:41:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-06T19:58:29","modified_gmt":"2023-01-06T19:58:29","slug":"what-was-tito-separate-way","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2018\/03\/08\/what-was-tito-separate-way\/","title":{"rendered":"\u041f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u044f  WHAT WAS TITO&#39;S SEPARATE WAY?"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><p><\/p>\n<pre style=\"background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #333333; font-size: 12px; padding-left: 18px;\">                           THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>                           DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS<br \/><br \/>                       The Politics of Eastern Europe<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>                        WHAT WAS TITO\u2019S SEPARATE WAY?<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>By:<br \/>Jonas Daniliauskas<br \/><br \/><br \/>Tutor:<br \/>Terence P McNeill<br \/><br \/>16 May 1995<br \/><br \/><br \/>Introduction<br \/><br \/>      The aim of this essay is to show  how  Josip  Broz  Tito  created  and<br \/>maintained the socialist system in Yugoslavia, which was some  kind  of  way<br \/>between the Soviet socialism and  Western  capitalism.  The  main  attention<br \/>will be focused on the reasons of the  Tito\u2019s  break  with  Stalin,  on  the<br \/>origins of the separate way, and the developments of this way.<br \/><br \/><br \/>The Situation in 1945-1948<br \/><br \/>      Early in November  1944,  Tito,  who  was  supreme  commander  of  the<br \/>National Liberation Army and Secretary-General of  the  Communist  Party  of<br \/>Yugoslavia (CPY)  and  Subasic,  who  was  a  representative  of  the  Royal<br \/>Yugoslav Government concluded a draft  political  agreement  that  elections<br \/>should be held to a Constituent Assembly which would decide  on  the  future<br \/>form  of  the  government  in  Yugoslavia.[1]A  new   Yugoslav   Provisional<br \/>Government was created on 7 March 1945. Tito became the last Royal  Yugoslav<br \/>Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  Defense.[2]  The  new   government   was<br \/>immediately recognised by the British, American and Soviet governments.<br \/>      In August 1945 the People\u2019s Front was  formed.  It  was  an  \u2018umbrella<br \/>organisation\u2019 in which those non-communist parties that still existed  would<br \/>collaborate with the CPY.[3] It organised a single list  of  candidates  for<br \/>the elections held on 11 November 1945 for  a  Constituent  Assembly.  About<br \/>90% of the electorate voted for the official candidates.<br \/>      The first act of the Constituent Assembly was to abolish the  monarchy<br \/>and declare Yugoslavia a Federal People\u2019s Republic.[4]<br \/>      Even before that  the  centre  of  political  power  already  was  the<br \/>Politburo of the CPY. From April 1945 currency reform, confiscation  of  the<br \/>property of former  collaborators,  the  nationalisation  of  most  existing<br \/>industry, and the strict control of rents were put into force.[5]<br \/>      The new Constitution of 31 January 1946 was based largely on the  1936<br \/>constitution of the SU. It had nationalised all industrial,  commercial  and<br \/>financial enterprises, limited  individual  landholdings  to  60  acres  and<br \/>organised the surplus agricultural land into collective farms.[6] About  1.6<br \/>million hectares of land were expropriated.<br \/>      So, in the first years of Tito\u2019s government Yugoslavia  was  a  highly<br \/>centralised  one-party  state.  The  centre  of  political  power  was   the<br \/>Politburo of the CPY. The first Five Year Plan for 1947-1952  was  published<br \/>and put into effect early in  1947.  With  the  reorganisation  of  federal,<br \/>republican and local government to cope with the first Five Year  Plan,  the<br \/>Yugoslav political-economic system came even closer to its Soviet model  and<br \/>became a single, giant, countrywide and monopolistic trust.[7]<br \/><br \/><br \/>The Origins of the Separate Way<br \/><br \/>      A few important factors and differences could be named as the  origins<br \/>of the Tito\u2019s break with Stalin and of  the  evolution  of  Tito\u2019s  separate<br \/>way.<br \/>      The biggest difference between Yugoslavia and the other East  European<br \/>countries was that in  Yugoslavia  -  and  only  in  Yugoslavia  -  had  the<br \/>Communists established themselves  in  power  without  important  assistance<br \/>from the SU.[8]Secondly, Stalin did not want to help Yugoslavia to build  up<br \/>a  balanced  economy.  It  suited  for  him  better  to  conclude  long-term<br \/>agreements under which Yugoslavia bound itself to sell raw materials at  low<br \/>prices, and ceased to  process  them.[9]  Thirdly,  Stalin  failed  to  give<br \/>Yugoslavia full support in its demands  for  the  cession  of  Trieste  from<br \/>Italy.[10]Finally, Stalin\u2019s aim was to create a  monolithic  socialist  bloc<br \/>under firmer Soviet control.[11]Stalin wished  to  secure  in  Yugoslavia  a<br \/>regime as obedient as any other in East Europe.[12]<br \/>      The basic issue was very simple:  whether  Tito  or  Stalin  would  be<br \/>dictator of Yugoslavia. What stood in Stalin\u2019s way was Tito\u2019s and hence  the<br \/>Yugoslav regime\u2019s autonomous strength.[13]<br \/>      The first sign the Yugoslavs had that  their  relations  with  the  SU<br \/>were moving towards a serious crisis came  in  February  1948,  when  Stalin<br \/>abruptly summoned high-level Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations  to  Moscow.<br \/>Tito sent Kardelj and Bakaric to join Djilas,  who  was  already  there  for<br \/>talks about Albania and Soviet military aid  to  Yugoslavia.  But  the  only<br \/>treaty signed was a Soviet text binding the Yugoslav government  to  consult<br \/>with the Soviet government on all foreign policy issues.[14]Soon after  that<br \/>Stalin postponed negotiations for a renewal  of  the  Soviet-Yugoslav  trade<br \/>agreement which was the keystone of Yugoslav economical  policy.  It  became<br \/>clear to the Yugoslav leaders that there was no prospect  of  healing  their<br \/>rift with the SU except by accepting total subordination.[15] At this  point<br \/>Tito took the conflict before the Central Committee of the CPY, on  1  March<br \/>1948. There the Politburo received a vote of confidence for their  rejection<br \/>of Soviet demands.[16]<br \/>      The Soviet responded after a few weeks.  On  18  March  they  informed<br \/>that  Soviet  military  advisers  and   instructors   in   Yugoslavia   were<br \/>\u2018surrounded by hostility\u2019 and would therefore all be withdrawn  immediately.<br \/>On the next day, a similar  announcement  was  made  in  respect  of  Soviet<br \/>civilian advisers.[17]<br \/>      In April Yugoslavia refused  to  attend  the  Cominform  meeting.  The<br \/>Cominform met without the Yugoslav delegation on 28 June 1948. The  CPY  was<br \/>condemned and it was declared that by refusing to  attend  the  meeting  the<br \/>Yugoslav Communists had placed themselves \u2018outside the family  of  fraternal<br \/>Communist Parties, outside the  united  Communist  front,  and  outside  the<br \/>ranks of the Cominform.\u2019[18]<br \/>       Stalin  took  further  economical  and  political  steps   to   place<br \/>Yugoslavia outside the Soviet Bloc. By summer 1949 deliveries to  Yugoslavia<br \/>had been slowed down or stopped, and by the  end  of  the  year,  all  trade<br \/>between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc has ceased.[19] From August 1949  all<br \/>countries of the Soviet Bloc denounced  their  treaties  of  friendship  and<br \/>mutual aid with Yugoslavia. The  CPY  as  well  as  Tito  had  been  finally<br \/>excommunicated and outlawed.[20]<br \/><br \/><br \/>The Separate Way<br \/><br \/>      After the break with the Soviet Bloc there  was  a  need  to  find  an<br \/>ideological basis for the unique Yugoslav position  as  a  Communist  nation<br \/>outside the Soviet community.[21]The Yugoslavs contended  that  the  SU  had<br \/>deviated  from  \u2018true  Marxism-Leninism\u2019  as  a  result  of  an  independent<br \/>Communist bureaucracy created by Stalin which transformed  the  dictatorship<br \/>of the proletariat into a dictatorship over the proletariat.[22]<br \/>      The essence of the new  doctrine  was  that  the  state  must  \u2018wither<br \/>away\u2019. The key to this development was decentralisation of  the  government,<br \/>of the economy, and, later, of the CPY.[23]<br \/>       The  essence  of  the  decentralisation  in  the  economy   was   the<br \/>introduction of  self-management  system.  First  real  step  towards  self-<br \/>management  was  the  Basic  Law  on  the  Management  of   State   Economic<br \/>Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Work  Collectives  which<br \/>came  into  force  in  June  1950.  In  fact,  this  law   remained   purely<br \/>declaratory, until the initial operational provisions were passed  in  1952-<br \/>1953. Then followed an endless zigzag of  constitutional,  legislative,  and<br \/>other  changes  and  reversals.[24]  In  April  1951  the  Federal  Planning<br \/>Commission was abolished. At the end of  1951  a  new  Law  on  the  Planned<br \/>Management of  the  National  economy  took  force.  The  Soviet  system  of<br \/>planning was abandoned. In its place the Yugoslavs  introduced  annual  (and<br \/>later medium-term) \u2018Social Plans\u2019, which at the  enterprise  level  were  no<br \/>longer directive and compulsory, but indicative.[25]<br \/>      In 1951-1952 there were several efforts to free  prices,  and  several<br \/>devaluations of dinar.[26]<br \/>       The  economical  reforms  were  followed  by  the  crucial  turn   in<br \/>agricultural   policy   in   early   1953,   when   the   movement    toward<br \/>collectivisation was reversed and the peasants were permitted to  leave  the<br \/>collective farms. Ever since that turn the  Yugoslav  agriculture  has  been<br \/>predominantly based on individual farming.[27]<br \/>      The  law  of  May  1949  on  People\u2019s  Committees  had  given  greater<br \/>political and economical powers to the district, as  opposed  to  republican<br \/>or federal, levels of government. An administrative reorganisation of  local<br \/>government units was designed to strengthen them  through  enlargement.  The<br \/>existing 7,104 local people\u2019s committees were  replaced  by  3,834  communes<br \/>grouped in 327 counties, plus 24 cities without county affiliations.[28]<br \/>      Administrative decentralisation  was  carried  further.  Many  of  the<br \/>Federal Ministries responsible for the  direct  management  of  the  economy<br \/>were abolished. In general, the number of ministries was reduced to 19  from<br \/>34.[29]<br \/>      The role of the CPY was also reformed. The 6th  Congress  of  the  CPY<br \/>met in November 1952. The redefinition  of  the  CPY  was  symbolised  by  a<br \/>change of name. The  CPY  became  the  LCY,  the  League  of  Communists  of<br \/>Yugoslavia.  The  Resolution  and  the  Statute  adopted  by  the   Congress<br \/>redefined the role of the Party. The \u2018basic duty  and  role  of  Communists\u2019<br \/>was \u2018political and ideological work in educating the masses.\u2019  The  LCY  \u2018is<br \/>not and cannot be the direct operative manager and  commander  in  economic,<br \/>State, or social life.\u2019[30]<br \/>      The conclusions  of  the  Law  on  People\u2019s  Committees  and  the  6th<br \/>Congress of the LCY were formally embodied in the new Constitutional Law  in<br \/>January  1953.   Article   3   pronounced   the   People\u2019s   Committees   of<br \/>municipalities and districts to be \u2018the basic  organs  of  state  authority\u2019<br \/>and limited the powers of federal and republican governments to  the  rights<br \/>(admittedly still considerable) specified  by  the  Federal  and  Republican<br \/>Constitutions.[31]So, the devolution of economic power  to  the  enterprises<br \/>was matched by a devolution of political power to the communes.[32]<br \/>      But as the reforms begun, the economic  situation  was  becoming  more<br \/>and  more  complicated.  After  the  beginning  of  the  economic  blockade,<br \/>Yugoslavia found itself in dangerous economic situation. Tito felt bound  to<br \/>turn to the West for economic  aid.  In  late  summer  1949  Yugoslavia  had<br \/>applied to the World Bank and the US Export-Import Bank for credits of  $250<br \/>million. The first formal request by the Yugoslav  government  for  American<br \/>foodstuffs was made in October 1950.<br \/>      On 18 November 1950 President Truman recommended the Congress a large-<br \/>scale scheme of aid to Yugoslavia, and on 29 November, an  American-Yugoslav<br \/>Aid Agreement was concluded.  By  the  end  of  January  1951,  the  sum  of<br \/>American aid had reached $17 million, with a further $35  million  promised,<br \/>and a further  (2  million  from  the  British.[33]In  summer  1952  the  US<br \/>administration made a further $30 million credit available, and by  the  end<br \/>of the year Yugoslav foreign trade had again  reached  its  total  level  of<br \/>1948, with the main Western powers taking the place of the Soviet Bloc.[34]<br \/>      The other result of American aid was the beginning  of  a  pro-Western<br \/>Yugoslav foreign policy.[35] On 14 November 1950, the US-Yugoslav  agreement<br \/>on the re-equipment of the Yugoslav Army was signed.[36]<br \/>      The American aid led to the boom of the  Yugoslav  economy  which  had<br \/>been  achieved  in  party  by  means  of   a   high   rate   of   investment<br \/>expenditure.[37]But by the end of 1961 the boom had turned  into  recession.<br \/>The growth rate for industrial production,  which  had  been  15%  in  1960,<br \/>declined to only 7% in 1961 and an annual rate of 4% in the  first  half  of<br \/>1962.[38]<br \/>      In January 1961 a number of economical reforms were introduced.  Banks<br \/>were made more independent, dinar was devalued.  But  this  mini-reform  was<br \/>unsuccessful.[39]Yugoslav  economy  needed   greater   reforms.   Yugoslavia<br \/>already was living beyond its means. In 1964 and the first half of 1965  the<br \/>country was incurring a balance-of-payments deficit at a rate of  more  than<br \/>$200 million annually.[40]<br \/>      All these problems led to the introduction of the Economic  Reform  in<br \/>1965, which had two principle aims: to make Yugoslav  goods  competitive  in<br \/>international  markets,  and  to  modernise  the  economy   by   eliminating<br \/>uneconomic investment  and  production  and  by  compelling  enterprises  to<br \/>respond to the forces of supply and demand.[41]The  Reform  had  five  major<br \/>components:<br \/>      1. Lower taxes;<br \/>      2. the role of the state in investment  allocations  was  henceforward<br \/>to be limited;<br \/>      3.  very  large  adjustments  in  product  prices  designed  to  bring<br \/>relative domestic prices designed to bring relative domestic  prices  closer<br \/>to world parities;<br \/>      4. the dinar was devalued from 750 to 1,250  to  the  dollar;  customs<br \/>duties, export subsidies and  the  range  of  quantative  restrictions  were<br \/>reduced; and Yugoslavia become a full member of GATT;<br \/>      5. private peasants were given the right to buy  farm  machinery,  and<br \/>the opportunity to obtain bank credits for this purpose.[42]<br \/>      But the immediate economic results of the Reform were  minor.  In  the<br \/>first years of the Reform Yugoslavia was facing rapid inflation,  a  serious<br \/>recession and growing unemployment.[43]The major effects of the Reform  were<br \/>in the sphere of banking and trade. The foreign trade was expanded.[44]<br \/>      The economic problems led to a rise  of  nationalism  in  Croatia  and<br \/>Slovenia. The most  productive  enterprises  were  located  in  Croatia  and<br \/>Slovenia, and it was in the interests of Croats and Slovenes to have a  less<br \/>centralised country. In Croatia agitation for  more  autonomy  went  to  the<br \/>length  of   demands   for   sovereign   independence   (but   in   Yugoslav<br \/>confederation) and a separate seat in  the  UN.[45]Tito\u2019s  response  to  the<br \/>\u2018national excesses\u2019 was to force the  resignation  and  replacement  of  the<br \/>highest-level Croatian leaders  in  December  1971.  During  1972,  the  LCY<br \/>leadership   structure   throughout   the   country   underwent   a    major<br \/>reshuffling.[46]<br \/>      In general, the 1970s were marked by the two major developments -  the<br \/>reconciliation with the SU, and the introduction of  the  \u2018delegate\u2019  system<br \/>by the Constitution of 1974.<br \/>      Brezhnev\u2019s visit to Belgrade in August 1971 symbolised the end of  the<br \/>period of acute suspicion. Tito returned Brezhnev\u2019s visit in June 1972,  and<br \/>negotiations were duly begun in September for the  huge  new  Soviet  credit<br \/>($1,300 million) for the construction  of  new  industries.[47]  In  October<br \/>1973, during a visit to Yugoslavia, Soviet Prime  Minister  Aleksei  Kosygin<br \/>and Yugoslav Prime Minister Djemal  Bijedic  agree  to  non-interference  in<br \/>internal affairs, industrial co-operation, and better understanding.[48]<br \/>      The major development in the domestic politics  was  the  promulgation<br \/>of the new Constitution in 21 February  1974.  There  were  three  principal<br \/>aims of this Constitution:<br \/>      1. to break down larger enterprises into smaller components;<br \/>      2. to eliminate direct elections;<br \/>      3. to introduce a new system of \u2018voluntary social planning\u2019.[49]<br \/>      Since 1974  Yugoslavia  was  ruled  by  \u2018delegates\u2019,  who  were  given<br \/>mandates by \u2018delegations\u2019, who in turn were mandated by the voters.[50]<br \/><br \/><br \/>Conclusions<br \/><br \/>      Tito has  proved  to  be  a  remarkable  statesman,  whose  deliberate<br \/>policies, pragmatic leadership have enabled his  country  to  survive  great<br \/>dangers and to build a system which had no analogue.[51]When  Tito  died  in<br \/>1980 Yugoslavia was unique.  It  was  the  only  communist  neutral  in  the<br \/>world.[52]<br \/>      The Yugoslav system differed from both the capitalist system  and  the<br \/>Soviet-type socialist system. On the one side there was very little  private<br \/>ownership of productive assets except in agriculture;  on  the  other  there<br \/>was  no  complete  system  of  central  planning.  Yugoslavia  shared   with<br \/>capitalism a market economy; and it shared with the SU  a  monopoly  Marxist<br \/>Party.[53]<br \/><br \/><br \/><br \/>                                BIBLIOGRAPHY<br \/><br \/>1. G.K.Bertch, \u2018The Revival of Nationalisms\u2019, in Problems of Communism,<br \/>1973, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 1-15<br \/>2. P.Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (6th ed., London and New York:<br \/>Longman, 1991)<br \/>3. K.Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge<br \/>(2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)<br \/>4. R.Lowenthall, \u2018Development vs.Utopia in Communist Policy\u2019, in Ch.Johnson<br \/>(ed.), Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press,<br \/>1970), pp. 33-116<br \/>5. H.Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon<br \/>Press, 1984)<br \/>6. Fr.W.Neal, Titoism in Action: The Reforms in Yugoslavia after 1948<br \/>(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958)<br \/>7. Fr.W.Neal and W.M.Fisk, \u2018Yugoslavia: Towards a Markat Socialism\u2019, in<br \/>Problems of Communism, 1966, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 28-37<br \/>8. A.Z.Rubinstein, \u2018Reforms, Nonalignment and Pluralism\u2019, in Problems of<br \/>Communism, 1968, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 31-41<br \/>9. D.Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (London: C.Hurst &amp; Company,<br \/>1977)<br \/>10. C.A.Zebot, \u2018Yugoslavia\u2019s \u201cSelf-Management\u201d on Trial\u2019, in Problems of<br \/>Communism, 1982, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 42-49<br \/>11. D.Wilson, Tito\u2019s Yugoslavia (Cambridge, London, New York,<br \/>Melbourne:Cambridge University Press, 1979)<br \/><br \/>-----------------------<br \/>[1]D.Wilson, Tito\u2019s Yugoslavia (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne:<br \/>Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 33<br \/>[2]D.Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (London: C.Hurst &amp; Company,<br \/>1977), p. 12<br \/>[3]D.Wilson, op. cit., p. 38<br \/>[4]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p.12<br \/>[5]D.Wilson, op. cit., p.38<br \/>[6]P.Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (6th ed., London and New York:<br \/>Longman, 1991), p.266<br \/>[7]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p.22<br \/>[8]F.W.Neal, Titoism in Action: The Reforms in Yugoslavia after 1948<br \/>(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 2<br \/>[9]D.Wilson, op. cit., p. 47<br \/>[10]H.Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon<br \/>Press, 1984), p. 60<br \/>[11]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p. 23<br \/>[12]P.Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 237<br \/>[13]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p. 25<br \/>[14]Ibid., pp. 26-27<br \/>[15]H.Lydall, op. cit., pp. 61-63<br \/>[16]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p. 27<br \/>[17]D.Wilson, op. cit., p.54<br \/>[18]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p. 29<br \/>[19]H.Lydall, op. cit., p. 63<br \/>[20]D.Wilson, op. cit., pp. 63-64<br \/>[21]F.W.Neal, op. cit., p. 7<br \/>[22]Ibid.<br \/>[23]Ibid., p. 8<br \/>[24]C.A.Zebot, \u2018Yugoslavia\u2019s \u201cSelf-Management\u201d on Trial\u2019, in Problems of<br \/>Communism, 1082, vol. 3, no.2, p. 43<br \/>[25]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p. 63<br \/>[26]H.Lydall, op. cit., p. 71<br \/>[27]R.Lowenthall, \u2018Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy\u2019, in<br \/>Ch.Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford<br \/>University Press, 1970), pp. 102-103<br \/>[28]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p.69<br \/>[29]K.Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge<br \/>(2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 256<br \/>[30]D.Rusinow, op. cit., pp. 74-75<br \/>[31]D.Wilson, op. cit., p.81<br \/>[32]H.Lydall, op. cit., p. 73<br \/>[33]D.Wilson, op. cit., pp. 74-75<br \/>[34]Ibid., p. 84<br \/>[35]F.W.Neal, op. cit., p.7<br \/>[36]D.Wilson, op. cit., p. 75<br \/>[37]D.Rusinow, op. cit., p. 108<br \/>[38]Ibid., p. 111<br \/>[39]H.Lydall, op. cit., p. 79<br \/>[40]A.Z.Rubinstein, \u2018Reforms, Nonalignment and Pluralism\u2019, in Problems of<br \/>Communism, 1968, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 32<br \/>[41]Fr.W.Neal and W.M.Fisk, \u2018Yugoslavia: Towards a Market Socialism\u2019, in<br \/>Problems of Communism, 1966, vol. 15, no. 6, p. 29<br \/>[42]H.Lydall, op. cit., pp. 81-82<br \/>[43]Ibid., p. 89<br \/>[44]Ibid., p. 90<br \/>[45]P.Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 267<br \/>[46]G.K.Bertsch, \u2018The Revival of Nationalisms\u2019, in Problems of Communism,<br \/>1973, vol. 22, no. 6, p. 4<br \/>[47]D.Wilson, op. cit., p. 209<br \/>[48]K.Dawisha, op. cit., p. 271<br \/>[49]H.Lydall, op. cit., p. 91<br \/>[50]Ibid., p. 103<br \/>[51]D.Wilson, op. cit., p. 262<br \/>[52]P.Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 269<br \/>[53]H.Lydall, op. cit., p. 150<br \/><\/pre>\n<div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS The Politics of Eastern Europe WHAT WAS TITO\u2019S SEPARATE WAY?By:Jonas DaniliauskasTutor:Terence P McNeill16 May 1995Introduction The aim of this essay is to show how Josip Broz Tito created andmaintained the socialist system in Yugoslavia, which was some kind of waybetween the Soviet socialism and Western capitalism. 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