{"id":110552,"date":"2017-12-02T09:39:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T09:39:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T11:01:50","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T11:01:50","slug":"the-collapse-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/the-collapse-2\/","title":{"rendered":"The &quot;Irreversible Collapse&quot;"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>What a difference a year makes.<\/p>\n<p>Last July, the Commander-in-Chief  of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, boasted that his nation  would add six carrier battle groups to its fleet, with construction of  the new vessels beginning in 2012.<\/p>\n<p>Most analysts were dubious  about that claim, but Moscow had one factor working in its favor. With  oil then trading at $150 a barrel, Russia was suddenly flush with cash,  and military leaders could once again dream on a grandiose scale.<\/p>\n<p>Twelve  months later, Admiral Vysotsky is no longer talking about six new  carrier battle groups. In fact, he sounds a lot like his predecessors of  the late 80s and early 90s, who simply tried to maintain some semblance  of a Russian fleet against overwhelming financial pressures. During  that decade, the once-proud Soviet Navy became a shadow of its former  self; ships spent almost no time at sea and out-of-area operations were  virtually unheard of.<\/p>\n<p>The decline was most evident in Russia&#8217;s  SSBN fleet. Over the past 10 years, there have been periodic &#8220;gaps&#8221; in  deployments by Russian ballistic missile subs&#8211;something that never  occurred in the Cold War. In some cases, a Russian &#8220;boomer&#8221; doesn&#8217;t go  to sea until months after its predecessor returned to port&#8211;an  operations schedule that was inconceivable before the fall of the Berlin  Wall.<\/p>\n<p>As Reuben Johnson of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.weeklystandard.com\/Content\/Public\/Articles\/000\/000\/016\/731xwcwk.asp?pg=1\"><em>The Weekly Standard<\/em> <\/a>explains:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The  reality now is that not only is the idea of Russia building and  operating carrier battle groups an impossible dream, but just building  enough new ships to replace those that are worn-out after decades of use  is also not feasible. A recent analysis by the authoritative  Moscow-based weekly, the Independent Military Review (NVO), entitled  &#8220;BMF RF (Naval Military Fleet of the Russian Federation) on Foreign  Warships&#8221; states that the Russian Navy is currently in a situation of  irreversible collapse.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The  analysis piece states the chief cause is the state of the Russian  shipbuilding industry, which is incapable &#8220;of producing warships in  either the quantity or at the level of quality that the navy customer  requires&#8221; for the future. According to those interviewed, the Russian  Navy&#8217;s leadership &#8220;understands that this is a hopeless situation and are  looking for a way out by considering the purchase of naval vessels from  abroad.&#8221;<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>Russian  naval leaders are acutely aware of this situation&#8211;and the economic  realities they now face. In a recent conversation with reporters,  Admiral Vysotsky said Russia is considering joint ventures with the  French (to build aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships), and  the possible purchase of submarines from Germany. However, it is  exceedingly unlikely that Moscow can pay for these vessels, giving  credence to prediction of the fleet&#8217;s eventual demise.<\/p>\n<p>Still, the  disappearance of the Russian Navy would create security problems for  the west. Moscow has not abandoned its desire to be a great power, and  must find ways to compensate for evaporating naval strength (and in  particular, the sea-based leg of its nuclear triad).<\/p>\n<p>The  solution? Play to your strengths, which in today&#8217;s Russia are (a) Its  ICBM force, and (b) U.S. willingness to cut its own strategic arsenal.  As we noted in previous posts, current discussions between Moscow and  Washington are focusing more on delivery platforms, rather than a  reduction of nuclear warheads.<\/p>\n<p>An agreement based on that  foundation would force deeper cuts among U.S. forces, forcing the  retirement of more land-based bombers and (possibly) ballistic missile  submarines, to get us under the new limit. The potential reductions  would also limit our ability to project power around the world, since  many of the delivery platforms&#8211;most notably the bombers&#8211;can be used  for conventional or nuclear missions. A decline in our global strike  capabilities would suit Moscow just fine; with the collapse of their  fleet, the Russians want to &#8220;downsize&#8221; our capabilities as well.<\/p>\n<p>And President Obama appears anxious to give the Moscow what it wants.<br \/>***<\/p>\n<p>ADDENDUM:  We should also note that the &#8220;end&#8221; of their navy will make Russia more  dependent than ever on nuclear weapons as a tool of statecraft. For more  than a decade, Russian military writers have discussed the employment  of nuclear weapons at much lower thresholds than during the Soviet era.  Their rationale is simple; without the massive conventional forces of  the former USSR, Moscow would be forced to utilize nuclear forces in  regional conflicts and even as a response to a devastating terrorist  attack.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>What a difference a year makes. Last July, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, boasted that his nation would add six carrier battle groups to its fleet, with construction of the new vessels beginning in 2012. Most analysts were dubious about that claim, but Moscow had one factor working in its favor. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110552"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=110552"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110552\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=110552"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=110552"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=110552"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}