{"id":110411,"date":"2017-12-02T15:32:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T15:32:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T11:00:38","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T11:00:38","slug":"who-won-battle-of-basra-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/who-won-battle-of-basra-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Who Won the Battle of Basra?"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>&#8230;Well, that depends on who you ask\u2014or which pundit you believe. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/doc\/20080414\/dreyfuss\">According to Robert Dreyfus of <em>The Nation<\/em><\/a> the big winners in the recent fighting were radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, his Mahdi Army and their allies in Tehran:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">As  the smoke clears over new rubble in Iraq&#8217;s second city, at the heart of  Iraq&#8217;s oil region, it&#8217;s apparent that the big winner of the Six-Day War  in Basra are the forces of rebel cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi  Army faced down the Iraqi armed forces not only in Basra, but in  Baghdad, as well as in Kut, Amarah, Nasiriyah, and Diwaniya, capitals of  four key southern provinces. That leaves Sadr, an anti-American rabble  rouser and nationalist who demands an end to the US occupation of Iraq,  and who has grown increasingly close to Iran of late, in a far stronger  position that he was a week ago. In Basra, he&#8217;s the boss. An Iraqi  reporter for the New York Times, who managed to get into Basra during  the fighting, <\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2008\/03\/31\/world\/middleeast\/31basra.html\"><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">concluded<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"> that the thousands of Mahdi Army militiamen that control most of the  city remained in charge. &#8220;There was nowhere the Mahdi either did not  control or could not strike at will,&#8221; he wrote. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The  other big winner in the latest round of Shiite-vs.-Shiite civil war is  Iran. For the past five years, Iran has built up enormous political,  economic and military clout in Iraq, right under the noses of 170,000  surge-inflated US occupying forces. (For details, see my March 10 Nation  article, &#8220;<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.thenation.com\/doc\/20080310\/dreyfuss\"><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">Is Iran Winning the Iraq War?<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">&#8220;)  Iran has strong ties to Iraq&#8217;s ruling Shiite alliance, which is  dominated by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, whose militia, the  Badr Corps, was armed, trained, financed and commanded by Iranians  during two decades in exile in Iran. Since then, hedging its bets, Iran  built a close relationship to Sadr&#8217;s Mahdi Army as well, and Sadr  himself has spent most of the time since the start of the US surge last  January in Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">[snip]<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">That  Sadr emerged victorious, and that Iran succeeded in brokering the deal  that ended the fighting, is a double defeat for the United States. It is  also a catastrophe for Maliki, and there is already speculation that  his government could collapse. An ill-timed offensive, poorly prepared  and poorly executed, resulted in an embarrassing defeat for Maliki. <\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>But contrast Dreyfus\u2019 account to that of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/\">Bill Roggio at the <em>Long War Journal<\/em><\/a>.  Mr. Roggio, a veteran of multiple embed tours in Iraq and Afghanistan,  paints a starkly different picture of the fighting and its results:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">Six  days after the Iraqi government launched Operation Knights\u2019 Charge in  Basrah against the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed Shia terror  groups, Muqtada al Sadr, the Leader of the Mahdi Army, has called for  his fighters to lay down their weapons and cooperate with Iraqi security  forces. Sadr\u2019s call for an end to the fighting comes as his Mahdi Army  has taken serious losses since the operation began.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">[snip]<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">Sadr\u2019s call for an end to fighting by his followers comes as his Mahdi Army <\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/archives\/2008\/03\/mahdi_army_taking_si.php\"><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">has taken high casualties<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"> over the past six days. Since the fighting began on Tuesday, 358 Mahdi  Army fighters were killed, 531 were wounded, 343 were captured, and 30  surrendered. The US and Iraqi security forces have killed 125 Mahdi Army  fighters in Baghdad alone, while Iraqi security forces have killed 140  Mahdi fighters in Basrah.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">From  March 25-29 the Mahdi Army had an average of 71 of its fighters killed  per day. Sixty-nine fighters have been captured per day, and another 160  have been reported wounded per day during the fighting. The US and  Iraqi military never came close to inflicting casualties at such a high  rate during the height of major combat operations against al Qaeda in  Iraq during the summer and fall of 2007.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>So,  which pundit got it right? We\u2019ll go with Bill Roggio, for a couple of  reasons. First of all, let\u2019s assume that the latest Mahdi uprising was  aimed at embarrassing (and weakening) the Iraqi government. If the  offensive was going so well, why did Sadr\u2014or more correctly, his patrons  in Iran\u2014decide to pull the plug? Assuming they still controlled large  sections of Basra, Iraq\u2019s second-largest city, the Mahdi fighters had  little reason to lay down their arms.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, it was Sadr who  ordered his factions to cooperate with Iraqi security forces. And the  reason for that is highlighted in Mr. Roggio\u2019s dispatch. During six days  of intense fighting, the Mahdi Army took a beating, literally and  figuratively. Even an insurgent force can\u2019t afford to lose over 200  fighters a day, including those killed and wounded.<\/p>\n<p>We doubt that  Sadr was concerned about the number of fighters he lost. What he  couldn\u2019t tolerate was the image of Iraqi security forces, backed by U.S.  troops and airpower, routing his forces in Basra and Baghdad. That sort  of black eye doesn\u2019t help Sadr, who still views himself as a major  political force in Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, the Mahdi Army\u2019s latest  ill-fated adventure hardly builds confidence in Iran, which has invested  millions in supporting Muqtadr al-Sadr and his fighters. Mr. Dreyfus  notes that Iraqi lawmakers flew to Tehran during the recent uprising,  asking for Iran\u2019s help in ending the fighting. Elements of the Iranian  government (most notably the military\u2019s Qods Force) agreed, and Sadr  issued his cooperation edict within hours. According to the <em>Nation\u2019s<\/em> analyst, Iran\u2019s eagerness to help is another example weakness in the Maliki government.<\/p>\n<p>But  that narrative seems to contradict the facts. If things were going  swimmingly in Basra (and elsewhere), Iran had no incentive to lean on  Sadr. On the other hand, if the Mahdi Army was taking unsustainable  losses, Iran had ample reason to call a truce. We should also point out  that the cease-fire (so far) is one-sided affair. According to Mr.  Roggio, the Iraqi government has not called for an cessation of  hostilities, and military operations continue.<\/p>\n<p>Given its political leanings, <em>The<\/em> <em>Nation\u2019s<\/em> take on the Basra situation is hardly surprising. The danger, of  course, is that such distortions will be repeated and amplified in the  MSM. Forty years ago, the Tet offensive was a military debacle for North  Vietnam\u2014until the U.S. media began reporting the story. Never  underestimate their ability to turn an enemy defeat into victory.<\/p>\n<p>***<\/p>\n<p>Incidentally, Mr. Roggio and his blog are profiled in the most recent edition of the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cjr.org\/profile\/blogging_the_long_war_1.php?page=all\">Columbia Journalism Review<\/a> as an example of authoritative, non-partisan war reporting. One more reason to get your war news from the <em>Long War Journal<\/em>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&#8230;Well, that depends on who you ask\u2014or which pundit you believe. According to Robert Dreyfus of The Nation the big winners in the recent fighting were radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, his Mahdi Army and their allies in Tehran: As the smoke clears over new rubble in Iraq&#8217;s second city, at the heart of Iraq&#8217;s oil [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110411"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=110411"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110411\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=110411"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=110411"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=110411"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}