{"id":110285,"date":"2017-12-02T16:32:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T16:32:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T10:59:30","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T10:59:30","slug":"ending-never-ending-debate-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/ending-never-ending-debate-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Ending the Never-Ending Debate"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>As Bret Stephens reminds us in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.opinionjournal.com\/columnists\/bstephens\/?id=110010827\">his most weekly <em>WSJ<\/em> column<\/a>,  the recent death of Paul Tibbets, the pilot of the B-29 that dropped  the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, will reinvigorate the debate about  &#8220;the strategic value and moral justification of the aerial bombardment  of civilian targets in wartime.&#8221; It&#8217;s a debate that&#8217;s been raging for  more than 60 years, and (unfortunately) shows no sign of slowing.<\/p>\n<p>Even  in an era of satellite-guided weapons and pin-point targeting, the  subject of &#8220;collateral damage&#8221;&#8211;including civilian casualties remains  contentious. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly complained  about civilian casualties from NATO airstrikes in his country, claiming  that &#8220;hundreds&#8221; of Afghans have died this year alone.<\/p>\n<p>It&#8217;s a  theme that has also been echoed on the campaign trail; Democratic  President hopeful Barack Obama recently accused allied forces of &#8220;air  raiding&#8221; villages in Afghanistan, inflicting civilian casualties that  turn local populations against us, and obliterate the gains of  individual bombing missions. Humanitarian concerns aside, it&#8217;s a message  that clearly resonates with the constituencies of both President Karzai  and Mr. Obama.<\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, it is worth noting that the  debate over the deliberate targeting of civilians is largely historic.  The last time it happened on a grand scale was during World War II, when  all sides bombed enemy population centers for psychological and  strategic reasons. Since then, western powers (particularly the United  States) have gone to great lengths to avoid collateral damage,  capitalizing on improved technology that has improved the accuracy of  aerial weapons, and the political need to avoid excessive civilian  casualties.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, many of the highly-publicized collateral  damage incidents in recent conflicts (the Al Fidros Bunker in Desert  Storm; the Djakovica convoy during Operation Allied Force, and recent  civilian deaths in Afghanistan) were the product of faulty intelligence,  or combatants hiding among innocents. They were not an attempt to sap  the morale of an enemy populace, a rationale sometimes used to justify  the targeting of cities during World War II.<\/p>\n<p>Regrettably, decades  of revisionist history have created the impression that killing enemy  civilians was a key aim of strategic bombing campaigns in the Second  World War. Mr. Stephens notes <a href=\"http:\/\/www.commentarymagazine.com\/viewarticle.cfm?id=10902\">a recent essay by Algis Valiunas in the summer issue of <em>Commentary<\/em><\/a>,  which highlights four recent books on the air war, with emphasis on  British and American raids against German targets. They are:<\/p>\n<p>Michael Bess\u2019s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Choices-Under-Fire-Moral-Dimensions\/dp\/0307263657\/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1\/103-7470706-4295814?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1183043990&amp;sr=1-1\">Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II <\/a>; J\u00f6rg Friedrich\u2019s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Fire-Bombing-Germany-1940-1945\/dp\/0231133804\/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1\/103-7470706-4295814?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1183044057&amp;sr=1-1\">The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940-1945<\/a>; A.C. Grayling\u2019s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Among-Dead-Cities-History-Civilians\/dp\/0802715656\/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1\/103-7470706-4295814?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1183044112&amp;sr=1-1\">Among the Dead Cities: The History and Moral Legacy of the World War II Bombing of Civilians in Germany and Japan <\/a>; and Marshall De Bruhl\u2019s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Firestorm-Allied-Airpower-Destruction-Dresden\/dp\/1400103347\/ref=sr_1_1\/103-7470706-4295814?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1183044145&amp;sr=1-1\">Firestorm: Allied Airpower and the Destruction of Dresden.<\/a> According to Valiunas, all four recount the history of air warfare in  theory and practice; describe the nature of the attacks and the damage  done to human life, property, and cultural inheritance; and examine  whether the bombings were militarily necessary or morally justifiable.  He also finds that three of the four are decidedly revisionist in their  conclusions.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">&#8220;&#8230;Bess, a history  professor at Vanderbilt University, has written the most wide-ranging  volume of the four, with chapters on topics as diverse as the Allied  pact with Stalin, kamikaze attacks, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo  war-crimes trials. In a chapter subtitled \u201cA Case of Moral Slippage,\u201d he  concludes that the large-scale bombing of cities was an unpardonable  atrocity, \u201cthe single greatest moral failure of the Anglo-American war  effort.\u201d Grayling, a philosophy professor at the University of London,  essentially concurs with this judgment, at much greater length; he goes  so far as to insist that Allied airmen ought to have refused to carry  out area-bombing raids, designed to kill civilians.&#8221; <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">&#8220;Friedrich,  a Berlin broadcast journalist turned historian, avoids Grayling\u2019s kind  of pontification, but nevertheless indicates that the time has come for  Germans to \u201cappropriate\u201d their past as the suffering victims of a brutal  air war. De Bruhl, a distinguished editor and publishing executive, is  the only one of the four to defend the firebombing of German cities,  with full awareness of how terrible the destruction was and how  difficult it is to make his case.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p>To support their  positions, each of the writers notes the horrors inflicted on the cities  of Hamburg (in 1943) and Dresden, in February 1945. Successive attacks  by RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force killed between  30-40,000 people over an eight-day period in late July and early August.  The heaviest raid, by 700 RAF bombers on the night of 27 July, touched  off a literal firestorm that killed 40,000 civilians&#8211;80% of those who  died during the campaign, dubbed Operation Gomorrah by the allies.<\/p>\n<p>While  Hamburg&#8217;s status as a legitimate target is beyond dispute&#8211;its  shipyards and manufacturing plants were vital to the German war  effort&#8211;Dresden is often cited as a city with no military value.  Instead, it is described as a &#8220;Florence on the Danube,&#8221; an artistic and  cultural center whose destruction has become emblematic of the Allied  bombing effort and its supposed moral failings. As Mr. Valiunas notes,  only one of the recent writers mentions Dresden&#8217;s importance to Hitler&#8217;s  military machine:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">De Bruhl  illustrates the point by listing some of the military-industrial  installations in Dresden\u2014110 of them, employing 50,000 people, and  manufacturing everything from small arms to aircraft to antiaircraft and  field guns to poison gas. He observes that the city was essential to  the national postal and telegraph system, and that three great railway  trunk routes met there. And he notes that the bombing helped ease the  Soviet westward advance and impeded the Nazi retreat. <\/span><\/p>\n<p>Additionally,  De Bruhl is only historian (among the four) who makes a case for  continuing American and British bombing raids into 1945, when allied  victory was already assured. Two months after Dresden, he writes,  President Harry Truman was told that Germany would not fall until  October 1945 (at the earliest), and Japan would continue fighting well  into 1946. Against that backdrop, Allied leaders  decided&#8211;correctly&#8211;that it was the worth the effort to sustain the  strategic bombing campaign. De Bruhl is also alone in noting that  Germany&#8217;s collapse accelerated extermination of the Jews, debunking  claims that there was no moral imperative for the air campaign after  1944.<\/p>\n<p>To be fair, there were limits on what the Allies achieved.  The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, released in September 1945, painted a  picture of mixed results. While the deliberate targeting of key  industries and production facilities limited German supplies of oil and  ammunition, Nazi production of other war staples&#8211;including aircraft and  armored vehicles&#8211;actually peaked in 1944, despite years of British and  American air attacks. Results of the survey also confirmed what Allied  intelligence analysts already knew; the accuracy attained by Army Air  Corps and RAF bombers was poor. Only 20% of the bombs landed within  1,000 feet of their intended aim points, and many missed the target by <em>miles.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Still,  any objective reading of history would suggest that the Allied bombing  campaigns against Germany and Japan were, indeed, morally defensible.  The revisionists tend to forget that the great raids on Hamburg, Berlin,  Dresden and Tokyo came after the terror bombings of Rotterdam, Oslo and  Shanghai. While the notion of revenge may provide shaky justification,  history records this is was the Axis (not the Allies) that initiated the  targeting of civilians during the war.<\/p>\n<p>True, enemy bombing raids  inflicted fewer casualties but the reasons are rooted in strategy, not  humanitarian concerns. First, by launching their own bomber offensive,  the Allies took the fight to Germany and Japan&#8211;forcing them to build  more fighters and anti-aircraft guns, rather than long-range bombers.  And secondly, while Japan and Germany embraced the ideals of strategic  aviation, both neglected to fully develop their bomber fleets.<\/p>\n<p>But  more importantly, moral concerns about Allied bombing campaigns during  World War II can summarized in a single question: what are good men  willing to do in order to defeat evil in their time? As Mr. Valiunas  writes, the answer lies in the conundrum that all democracies face in  going to war:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The war locked decent  men into a tragic dilemma. In so consuming a conflict, in which the  stakes are nothing less than the survival of civilization, a decent  people\u2019s viciousness increases in direct proportion to that of its most  unclean enemy\u2014or else its chances of survival diminish drastically. To  fail to do all you can to defeat an enemy truly malignant would be the  greatest evil. <\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>Valiunas  also believes that the real moral failing of the west occurred before  the war began, and not when fleets of B-17s, B-24s and Lancaster bombers  wreaked death and destruction on Germany:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">The  fire from the sky that consumed Germany in 1945 became a necessary  instrument of war only because the Allies failed to stop Hitler when he  was just getting started. It is a lesson to take to heart as we face the  prospect of another conflagration with a ruthless and evil enemy that  is just getting started.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\"><\/span><br \/>That&#8217;s  the real lesson to carry from the endless debate over the justification  for Allied strategic bombing in World War II. General Tibbets should be  remembered as a hero, not a war criminal. Continuing the controversy  about the &#8220;morality&#8221; of our bombing campaigns from 60 years ago is the  latter day equivalent of arguing about how many angels can fit on the  head of a pin. It may be an interesting intellectual argument, and fill  more than a few books. But in the end, it&#8217;s a pointless exercise, and  one that obscures history&#8217;s real lessons for contemporary audiences.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>As Bret Stephens reminds us in his most weekly WSJ column, the recent death of Paul Tibbets, the pilot of the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, will reinvigorate the debate about &#8220;the strategic value and moral justification of the aerial bombardment of civilian targets in wartime.&#8221; It&#8217;s a debate that&#8217;s [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110285"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=110285"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110285\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=110285"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=110285"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=110285"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}