{"id":110257,"date":"2017-12-02T16:51:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T16:51:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T10:59:14","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T10:59:14","slug":"fear-and-loathing-in-iran-and-elsewhere-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/fear-and-loathing-in-iran-and-elsewhere-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Fear and Loathing in Iran (and Elsewhere)"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/2.bp.blogspot.com\/_Y7kQSOBuEJw\/RwFPZJ-S2OI\/AAAAAAAAAJU\/ful5p4CK6aU\/s1600-h\/Pantsyr-S1.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"206\" height=\"150\" alt=\"\" border=\"0\" id=\"BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5116457945262119138\" src=\"http:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/pantsyr-s1-1.jpg\" class=\"wp-image-110258\" style=\"cursor: hand;\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><em>Pantsir-S1 gun-missile air defense system (GlobalSecurity.org)<\/em><\/p>\n<div>A hat tip to our friends at <a href=\"http:\/\/kentsimperative.blogspot.com\/\">Kent&#8217;s Imperative<\/a>,  one of the most insightful (and thoughtful) blogs on the intelligence  community and related concerns. Kent&#8217;s found this recent item at <a href=\"http:\/\/www.strategypage.com\/htmw\/htada\/articles\/20070928.aspx\">Strategy Page<\/a>, detailing some of the repercussions from that recent Israeli air strike on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div><a href=\"http:\/\/www.strategypage.com\/htmw\/htada\/articles\/20070928.aspx\">According to Strategy Page<\/a>,  Iran is a bit upset over the alleged &#8220;failure&#8221; of Russian air defense  systems during the raid. Both Tehran and Damascus have spent billions on  radar and missile systems built in Russia, with the assurance that such  equipment could defend against an Israeli attack. Complaints that have  made their way onto Farsi-language message boards (presumably from  Iranian military officers) suggest that the IAF was able to blind  Syria&#8217;s defensive systems, rendering them useless. The Israeli strike  package flew across hundreds of miles of Syrian airspace, strike the  target and return, unmolested by air defense systems. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>Iran&#8217;s  concerns are three-fold. First, there is logical speculation that the  recent raid on Syria was a dress rehearsal for an attack on Iran&#8217;s  nuclear sites, although that raid would be larger and much more complex.  Secondly, Tehran is footing the bill for Syria&#8217;s most recent upgrade,  the acquisition of the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. Iran is also  slated to acquire the system, although initial deliveries were made to  Damascus. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>Equipped with two 30mm cannon and  twelve Tunguska missiles, the Pantsir-S1 was supposed to provide  point-defense for high-value targets&#8211;like that Syrian nuclear facility.  The system&#8217;s on-board radar can detect medium-altitude targets up to 30  miles away; the Pantsir&#8217;s cannons are effective against targets up to  10,000 feet, and the missiles have a maximum range of roughly nine  miles. In terms of close-in air defense, the Pantsir is supposed to be  state-of-the-art, but it (apparently) proved ineffective against the  Israeli raid. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>Tehran&#8217;s third concern? The  Iranian air defense network is far more chaotic than its Syrian  counterpart. In recent years, there have been credible reports about  Iranian fighters sent out in pursuit of mystery lights and &#8220;UFOs,&#8221; and  near-fratricide incidents involving civilian airliners. If the Israelis  were successful in blinding Syria&#8217;s more centralized system (which  covers a relatively small area), then they should have little problem in  creating mass confusion within the Iranian network. Assuming that  Israel eventually attacks, Iranian air defense crews could find  themselves operating in a de-centralized mode, chasing targets that  don&#8217;t exist, and illuminating their radars with the knowledge that an  anti-radar missile may be on the way. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>If the  reported grousing about Russian hardware sounds familiar, it should.  We&#8217;ve seen this happen&#8211;to varying degrees&#8211;after almost every  successful Israeli raid or air strike. The &#8220;operators&#8221; (in this case  Iran and Syria) start complaining that their expensive air defense  equipment didn&#8217;t operate correctly&#8211;and point the finger of blame at  Russia. If Moscow follows form, we&#8217;ll start hearing whispers that &#8220;the  Arabs&#8221; or &#8220;the Persians&#8221; are incompetent, or didn&#8217;t follow the tactics  manual. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>Who&#8217;s right? To some degree, both are.  As we&#8217;ve noted before, Russian defense firms typically don&#8217;t offer an  inclusive &#8220;one price&#8221; package that includes equipment, training and  logistical support as part of an arms sale. If you want extensive  training or maintenance support, that will cost more&#8211;and those are the  very areas where clients are often tempted to cut corners. A handful of  air defense crews may receive the &#8220;complete&#8221; training syllabus from  Russian experts, and the rest are trained by that cadre. In some cases,  that&#8217;s the equivalent of xeroxing a poor copy, rather than the original.  The quality of the product decreases with each generation, as new  operators absorb the bad habits of their predecessors. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>However,  given the fact that the Pantsir-S1 recently arrived in Syria, it&#8217;s a  reasonable assumption that most&#8211;if not all&#8211;of the crews were Russian  trained. And that brings us to another defect often found in air defense  networks that are equipped and trained by Moscow. Damascus&#8217;s air  defenses tend to be rigid in their doctrine and employment; air defense  crews depend on higher echelons to identify and assign targets. <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>If  those echelons fail&#8211;or they&#8217;re blinded by enemy countermeasures&#8211;they  leave individual fire units in an autonomous mode, an environment  they&#8217;re unprepared for. If the Syrian air defense SOC (sector operations  center) failed to &#8220;cue&#8221; air defenses at the nuke site, then it&#8217;s quite  likely that they never fired until the bombs began falling (if they  responded at all). <\/div>\n<p><\/p>\n<div>Needless to say, future  sales of the Pantsir-S1 will be a little bit tougher, even if the  system&#8217;s &#8220;poor&#8221; performance was the result of Syrian buffoonery. <\/div>\n<div>***<\/div>\n<div>ADDENDUM:  The Syrian &#8220;failure&#8221; also indicates that Damascus still doesn&#8217;t grasp  the impact of tactics and stand-off weapons. If Syrian Pantsir fire  units were operating from fixed positions, it was simple for the  Israelis to plan optimum routes to minimize exposure. Fixed site  operations would also make it easier for the IAF to target Syrian air  defense assets with stand-off weapons, including JDAM. The GPS-guided  munition has a maximum range of up to 15 miles (and some versions can  hit targets from even greater distances). That stand-off capability  would allow IAF jets to take out Pantsir units before the air defenses  could engage them. With that threat negated, other aircraft could then  strike the nuclear complex. <\/div>\n<div>Another option would  be targeting the Pantsir&#8217;s radar with anti-radiation missiles from even  greater distances. In either case, the Israelis had the ability to take  out the Syrian air defenses before they could fire. No wonder the  Iranians are worried&#8211;and rightfully so. <\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Pantsir-S1 gun-missile air defense system (GlobalSecurity.org) A hat tip to our friends at Kent&#8217;s Imperative, one of the most insightful (and thoughtful) blogs on the intelligence community and related concerns. Kent&#8217;s found this recent item at Strategy Page, detailing some of the repercussions from that recent Israeli air strike on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":110258,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110257"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=110257"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110257\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/110258"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=110257"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=110257"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=110257"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}