{"id":110223,"date":"2017-12-02T17:05:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-02T17:05:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T10:58:51","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T10:58:51","slug":"the-case-of-nukes-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/02\/the-case-of-nukes-2\/","title":{"rendered":"The Case of the &quot;Missing&quot; Nukes"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/3.bp.blogspot.com\/_Y7kQSOBuEJw\/Rt7JxLB26RI\/AAAAAAAAAFs\/lyk64xqOFJo\/s1600-h\/MinotB-52.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"320\" height=\"141\" alt=\"\" border=\"0\" id=\"BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5106740874096077074\" src=\"http:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/minotb-52-1.jpg\" class=\"wp-image-110224\" style=\"cursor: hand;\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><em>B-52s at Minot AFB, North Dakota<\/em>. <em>A  Minot-assigned bomber inadvertently carried five nuclear warheads  during a cross-country flight to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on August  30th, raising concerns about weapons safety and accountability. <\/em><\/p>\n<p>There&#8217;s  something a bit strange about this Drudge-trumpeted story, concerning  the Air Force&#8217;s &#8220;temporary loss&#8221; of five nuclear warheads. As reported  by the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thetowntalk.com\/apps\/pbcs.dll\/article?AID=\/20070904\/NEWS01\/70904040\"><em>Military Times<\/em> <\/a>papers,  the warheads were mounted on advanced cruise missiles being flown by a  B-52 bomber from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana.  Both Minot and Barksdale are B-52 bases; the movement is part of an  effort to decommission 400 of the cruise missiles. The warheads were  supposed to be removed before the missiles left Minot, but the error  wasn&#8217;t discovered until the &#8220;Buff&#8221; touched down in Louisiana last  Thursday.<\/p>\n<p>According to the <em>Times<\/em>, that left the weapons  &#8220;unaccounted for&#8221; during the 3 1\/2 hour flight from North Dakota to  Louisiana. However, that&#8217;s a specious claim, at best. As Air Force  spokesman Lt Col Ed Henry noted, the weapons were in the service&#8217;s  custody and control at all times. He also reported that all other  nuclear weapons at Minot have been accounted for.<\/p>\n<p>What&#8217;s more  disconcerting is the (apparent) break-down in the nuclear chain of  custody. Readers of my profile know that I spent portions of my career  around nukes, both as an operational intelligence officer and a  targeteer. My duties didn&#8217;t involve the actual handling or loading of  those weapons, but you learned quickly that nukes are governed by a  completely different set of rules, for obvious reasons. Those  regulations are strictly enforced, with &#8220;no tolerance&#8221; for mistakes.<\/p>\n<p>First,  nuclear weapons are segregated from &#8220;ordinary&#8221; munitions, with  additional layers of security and access control. All personnel involved  in the protection, storage, handling and loading of the weapons are  carefully vetted through the military&#8217;s Personnel Reliability Program  (PRP). Anyone whose loyalty, judgment or stability comes into question  loses their PRP certification, and they&#8217;re no longer allowed to work  around nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n<p>Other safeguards are built into the  system as well. There&#8217;s a very tight chain of control; the device is  literally &#8220;signed for&#8221; at every step of the journey from the weapons  storage area to the aircraft, and the two-man &#8220;rule&#8221; is strictly  enforced. An individual pilot or load crew member is never allowed to  &#8220;control&#8221; the weapon on the ground. In combat, the pilot of a  single-seat fighter would be permitted to launch with a nuclear  weapon&#8211;and use it in combat&#8211;but only if the pilot was certified for  the mission, and the &#8220;tasking&#8221; had been properly authenticated through  the chain of command, beginning with the President, or in tactical  scenarios, the theater commander&#8211;under authority granted by the POTUS.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.msnbc.msn.com\/id\/20427730\/\">MSNBC is now reporting that a B-52 squadron commander at Minot has been relived of his duties,<\/a> because the service has &#8220;lost confidence&#8221; in his ability to handle  nuclear weapons. That move is hardly surprising, given the obvious  emphasis that the Pentagon places on nuclear safety and control. And,  it&#8217;s likely that other heads will roll as the Air Force continues its  investigation. As we noted in the preceding paragraphs, the movement,  loading and protection of nuclear weapons is a carefully regulated  process, involving a number of specialists. All could be found culpable  in this incident.<\/p>\n<p>But that still doesn&#8217;t explain how  nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were loaded onto a B-52, flown 1450 miles  across the United States, and the mistake wasn&#8217;t discovered until the  bomber reached its destination in Louisiana. With most of the Advanced  Cruise Missile fleet (AGM-129) is being retired from operational  service, we can assume that Minot crews had been through this drill  before. Remove the warhead from the missile, then fly the inert weapon  to Barksdale for decommissioning. Retiring the warhead&#8211;if that&#8217;s part  of the plan&#8211;entails a separate (and completely different) process which  does not require a B-52 flight.<\/p>\n<p>Given the elaborate safeguards,  security procedures and chain-of-control associated with nuclear  weapons, it&#8217;s difficult to fathom how five warheads made their way onto  that Buff and they weren&#8217;t noticed until it arrived at Barksdale. It  would be interesting to know how the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.minot.af.mil\/main\/welcome.asp\">5th Bomb Wing <\/a>(Minot&#8217;s  B-52 unit) fared on its last Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI), which  evaluates unit procedures for controlling, handling and safeguarding  those weapons.<\/p>\n<p>Something tells me the NSI team will be returning  to Minot very soon, and they&#8217;ll probably evaluate a wing with a new  leadership team. Wing commanders who fail their NSI are usually fired;  allowing one of your aircraft (and crews) to &#8220;unwittingly&#8221; carry five  nuclear warheads across country is an equally serious offense. It will  be interesting to see if the wing&#8217;s current commander survives this  embarrassing incident.<\/p>\n<p>***<\/p>\n<p>Ironically, the Minot  episode reminds us that the nuclear &#8220;sabre&#8221; was once brandished more  openly. During much of the Cold War, Strategic Air Command B-52s (and  other bombers) flew &#8220;airborne alert&#8221; missions, with nuclear weapons  onboard. The aircraft loitered near departure points over the North  Atlantic (and elsewhere), ready to launch nuclear strike missions  against the Soviet Union upon direction from the National Command  Authority (NCA). Airborne alert came to an end after a pair of  highly-publicized accidents involving B-52s carrying nukes.<\/p>\n<p>In  the first event, a bomber collided with a KC-135 tanker during an  in-flight refueling off the coast of Spain in January 1966, touching off  a frantic search for the B-52&#8217;s four nuclear weapons, which fell into  the ocean. The last of the weapons was recovered 80 days later. In 1968,  another Buff crashed during an emergency landing at Thule AB,  Greenland, spilling radioactive debris across the ice and snow. Hundreds  of airmen worked for months cleaning up the radioactive waste. After  that, SAC&#8217;s airborne alert program came to an end.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>B-52s at Minot AFB, North Dakota. A Minot-assigned bomber inadvertently carried five nuclear warheads during a cross-country flight to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on August 30th, raising concerns about weapons safety and accountability. There&#8217;s something a bit strange about this Drudge-trumpeted story, concerning the Air Force&#8217;s &#8220;temporary loss&#8221; of five nuclear warheads. As reported by the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":110224,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110223"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=110223"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/110223\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/110224"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=110223"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=110223"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=110223"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}