{"id":109985,"date":"2017-12-04T13:43:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-04T13:43:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T10:56:52","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T10:56:52","slug":"what-beeb-doesn-tell-you","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/04\/what-beeb-doesn-tell-you\/","title":{"rendered":"What the Beeb Doesn&#39;t Tell You"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>The BBC&#8217;s &#8220;security correspondent,&#8221; Frank Gardner, is reporting that <a href=\"http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/2\/hi\/middle_east\/6376639.stm\">U.S. contingency plans for striking Iran &#8220;extend beyond nuclear sites and include most of the country&#8217;s military infrastructure.<\/a>&#8221;  Mr. Gardner also claims that planners at U.S. Central Command &#8220;have  already selected their target sets in Iran,&#8221; a list that reportedly  includes key nuclear facilities at Bushehr, Khondab (Arak), Esfahan and  Natanz.<\/p>\n<p>My response can be summed up in one word: Duh.<\/p>\n<p>We&#8217;ve  been down this road before, but I&#8217;ll take another shot at  &#8220;de-mystifying&#8221; the world of military planning. While stories like this  one sound sensational (and they&#8217;re useful in conveying a message to  hostile regimes), much of the &#8220;planning&#8221; described in the BBC article is  largely routine, and reflects a process that has been on-going for  years.<\/p>\n<p>Let&#8217;s start with the targeting process. The days when air  planners literally selected bombing targets a day or two before the  mission have long since passed. Efforts to locate, identify, and analyze  potential targets now begin years in advance. Military intelligence  organizations catalogue these sites in voluminous documents called a  Basic Encyclopedia (BE). There is at least one encyclopedia for each of  our potential adversaries. Potential targets are listed by name and by a  specific BE number (or, in the case of larger complexes, multiple BE  numbers), allowing planners and analysts to gather (and access)  information on those facilities.<\/p>\n<p>Data on potential targets is  compiled in individual folders, listed again by facility name and BE  number. Target folders include (at a minimum) a description of the  facility, imagery of the complex, a summary of defenses in the area, and  a list of desired mean points of impact (DMPIs)&#8211;points that must be  struck successfully to destroy the site, or inflict maximum damage.  These folders are constantly updated; CENTCOM (like other combat  commands) has a portion of its J-2 (intelligence) staff that does  nothing but work the targeting problem. The goal is a targeting database  that is accurate, current, and provides the widest array of potential  options for campaign planners.<\/p>\n<p>The overall process works  something like this: the President and his senior advisers set overall  strategy; the combatant command (in this case, CENTCOM), creates a  military campaign plan that will meet the commander-in-chief&#8217;s  objectives. Operational planning for air, ground, naval and special  forces elements is the responsibility of various component commanders in  those areas. If a strike against Iran is based heavily on air and naval  options, the day-to-day planning (and execution) authority will fall on  the shoulders of U.S. Central Air Forces (USCENTAF) and the U.S. Fifth  Fleet, the air and naval elements of CENTCOM.  And, once again, these  short-term plans and execution orders (say, the Air Tasking Order which  outlines all air operations in the theater for a prescribed period)  support the campaign plan and the overall political\/military strategy. <\/p>\n<p>At  the risk of sounding redundant, let me emphasize again that this  planning process is cumulative in nature; operational plans (OPlans) for  the Iranian problem have existed for decades. These plans are  constantly reviewed and updated to meet changing requirements.  Thirty  years ago, plans for Iran focused on countering a Russian invasion;  today, the OPlans are aimed at more relevant issues, such as deterring  Tehran&#8217;s regional ambitions and WMD programs.  But some of the same  units and basing options that would have countered a Soviet invasion in  the 1970s would also be used today, in countering new threats related to  Iran.  <\/p>\n<p>Simply stated, the military simply doesn&#8217;t have the time  to build a new plan for every situation that arises, so relevant items  from existing plans are &#8220;borrowed,&#8221; shaped and modified to meet changing  contingencies.  That&#8217;s why OPlans and basic encyclopedias are such  vital tools; they provide the planning foundation for any military  campaign, with the flexibilty to make changes (as required).  Any  potential attack against Iran will be the product of decades of  research, analysis and planning, down to the target sets, number of  aircraft and ships involved, and even the types of weapons that may be  used.<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, it&#8217;s no surprise that a theoretical Iran campaign  would include targets outside that country&#8217;s nuclear program. There are  a number of elements that support a weapons program&#8211;electrical grids,  research complexes, transportation hubs and mining facilities, to name a  few. Strikes against those targets would further impede a covert  nuclear program, and slow the recovery of Tehran&#8217;s overt efforts.  Additionally, attacks against Iran&#8217;s military facilities would also be  required, to (a) minimize danger to allied military forces in the  region, (b) help destabilize the regime in Tehran and (c) pave the way  for follow-on strikes inside that country. Such requirements are one  reason that Israel has been pressing for a U.S. military option, since  they lack the forward basing and combat persistence needed for a  sustained campaign against Iran.<\/p>\n<p>As for the &#8220;triggers&#8221; for a  potential attack (outlined in the BBC report), those seem fairly broad,  although proving either scenario could be difficult. For example, there  is ample, annecdotal evidence that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, but  conclusive proof of that effort has not been obtained (or at least,  publicly revealed). In the past, ircumstantial evidence might have been  sufficient to launch military strikes, but in the aftermath of the Iraq  WMD debacle, more concrete information is probably required. A similar  level of proof is likely demanded for the &#8220;other&#8221; potential trigger: a  high-casualty attack on U.S. forces in Iraq that could be linked  directly to Iran. Recent media accounts suggest that there is  considerable debate in Washington about Iranian support for terrorists  in Iraq, and the involvement of senior officials in Tehran; given that  disagreement, it might be difficult to obtain irrefutable evidence of  Iranian complicity in a mass-casualty attack on U.S. troops in Iraq. In  both cases, the level of proof required for military action may actually  be higher than the media would suggest.<\/p>\n<p>But such distinctions  are lost on outlets like the &#8220;Beeb,&#8221; who&#8217;ve been peddling this story (in  one form or another) for months. By hinting that the targets have been  selected (and even listing some of the high-profile nuclear sites), the  MSM is suggesting that it&#8217;s just a matter of weeks before the bombs  start falling in Iran. And, for all we know, that may be true. But if we  launch military strikes against that country, it will be the product of  years of analysis and preparation, and not the result of some  hastily-conceived planning effort.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The BBC&#8217;s &#8220;security correspondent,&#8221; Frank Gardner, is reporting that U.S. contingency plans for striking Iran &#8220;extend beyond nuclear sites and include most of the country&#8217;s military infrastructure.&#8221; Mr. Gardner also claims that planners at U.S. Central Command &#8220;have already selected their target sets in Iran,&#8221; a list that reportedly includes key nuclear facilities at Bushehr, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/109985"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=109985"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/109985\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=109985"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=109985"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=109985"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}