{"id":109907,"date":"2017-12-04T15:51:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-04T15:51:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T10:56:14","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T10:56:14","slug":"the-sa-15-arrives-in-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/04\/the-sa-15-arrives-in-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"The SA-15 Arrives in Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>As expected, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jpost.com\/servlet\/Satellite?cid=1162378474759&amp;pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull\">Russia has begun deliveries of the TOR-M1 air defense system to Iran<\/a>.  Tehran and Moscow signed a deal for the TOR-M1 (NATO codename: SA-15)  more than a year ago, and many analysts (including your humble  correspondent) predicted that the air defense system would begin  arriving in Iran in late 2006 or early 2007&#8211;if it arrived at all. As we  noted last year, Iran had a long history of initiating arms deals, only  to back out at the last moment. The SA-15 sale went through for a  variety of reasons, including the continued deterioration of Iran&#8217;s air  defense system.<\/p>\n<p>Putting in bluntly, Iran&#8217;s air defense network is  overdue for a new, medium-range missile system. Despite a long-standing  arms embargo, Tehran still relies on the U.S.-built I-HAWK as its  primary surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. While the I-HAWK was highly  effective in the war with Iraq, the Iranian SAM batteries are now  hampered by aging equipment, limited spare parts, poor maintenance, and  ineffective training. As the number of available missiles, launchers,  radars and support hardware continues to dwindle, Tehran was forced to  look for new systems to provide SAM defenses.<\/p>\n<p>However, the number  of SA-15s is not equal to the I-HAWK inventory that will eventually be  phased out. As a result, Iran&#8217;s medium-range SAM arsenal will be a mixed  bag of I-HAWKs, SA-15s and SA-6s, which are also being acquired from  Russia. While collectively, these systems can  provide protection of key  targets, gaps in overall coverage will remain, and can be exploited by  potential adversaries, including Israel.  Beyond that, Iran&#8217;s primary  foes already have a detailed understanding of the SA-15, and  comprehensive knowledge of both the I-HAWK and the SA-6.  That technical  expertise translates into effective counter-measures, including jamming  programs for fighter aircraft that might be used to strike targets in  Iran. <\/p>\n<p>Tehran&#8217;s air defense upgrade is also hampered by other  factors, including gaps in early warning radar coverage, lack of an  automated, nationwide command-and-control system, and the traditional  rivalry between the &#8220;regular&#8221; Iranian military and the Revolutionary  Guards Corps (IRGC).  Most of Iran&#8217;s recent military upgrades have gone  to the IRGC (including the SA-6), and the SA-15 is likely to wind up in  that arsenal as well.  But IRGC air defense units still rely heavily on  the regular military (specifically, the Iranian Air Force) for early  warning radar coverage and an air defense picture, used to assess  possible threats, and (if required) assign targets to specific SAM  batteries, fighter units, or AAA sites. <\/p>\n<p>Despite recent  upgrades&#8211;including the SA-15&#8211;Iran&#8217;s air defense network is still beset  by confusion on a daily basis.  Significant gaps in radar coverage,  limited automation, and a lack of cooperation between the regular  military and the IRGC have resulted in missed assignments and  near-fratricide on numerous occasions.  Comparing Iran&#8217;s air defense  system to a Chinese fire drill isn&#8217;t an exaggeration.  Faced with a  massive, U.S.-led attack, the Iranian C2 network would quickly crumble,  leaving air defense units largely on their own. <\/p>\n<p>While the SA-15  is more than capable of autonomous operations, it works better as part  of a fully-functioning air defense system, relying on external sensors  for target detection and cueing. Left on their own, the effectiveness of  an SA-15 battery would depend largely on the skill of the operators,  and (unfortunately for the Iranians), their crews are still  inexperienced.  More realistic training would remedy that problem&#8211;to  some degree&#8211;but Tehran has always been cautious in that arena, limiting  life-fire exercises and other drills that require the expenditure of  ordnance. <\/p>\n<p>As we noted last year, the SA-15 is a major upgrade  for Iran&#8217;s air defense system.  But, on its own, the system is not a  world-beater, and would not provide sufficient deterrence to prevent a  U.S. or Israeli attack.  If Tehran is genuinely serious about bringing  its air defense network into the 21st century, we would see deals for  additional SAM systems (like the long-range, lethal SA-20), significant  upgrades in early warning radars (with emphasis on equipment with  capabilities against LO\/VLO targets) and full integration of a  nationwide, automated command-and-control system. <\/p>\n<p>A few days  before the SA-15 delivery was announced, Iran&#8217;s president announced that  &#8220;Israel was unable to attack his country.&#8221;  If he was basing that  assessment on the availability of the new SAM system, it was a gross  miscalculation.  U.S. and Israeli air planners have a healthy respect  for the SA-15, but it is not a show-stopper, particularly if Iran  operates the system from fixed sites (like the I-HAWK), making it easier  to track key components&#8211;and target them.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>As expected, Russia has begun deliveries of the TOR-M1 air defense system to Iran. Tehran and Moscow signed a deal for the TOR-M1 (NATO codename: SA-15) more than a year ago, and many analysts (including your humble correspondent) predicted that the air defense system would begin arriving in Iran in late 2006 or early 2007&#8211;if [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/109907"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=109907"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/109907\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=109907"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=109907"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=109907"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}