{"id":109870,"date":"2017-12-04T16:17:00","date_gmt":"2017-12-04T16:17:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2023-01-08T10:55:54","modified_gmt":"2023-01-08T10:55:54","slug":"the-administration-strikes-back","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/2017\/12\/04\/the-administration-strikes-back\/","title":{"rendered":"The Administration Strikes Back"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;\" class=\"sharethis-inline-share-buttons\" ><\/div><h3 class=\"post-title entry-title\" itemprop=\"name\"><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\"> <\/div>\n<p>Readers of today&#8217;s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washtimes.com\/national\/20061012-124127-8808r.htm\"><em>Washington Times<\/em> <\/a>got a ring-side seat for the latest skirmish between the Bush Administration and elements within the intelligence community.<\/p>\n<p>Speaking  on the condition of anonymity, administration officials severely  criticized recent intelligence assessments on North Korea, describing  them as &#8220;flawed&#8221; and hampered U.S. attempts to avert Pyongyang&#8217;s  attempted nuclear test. Administration sources cited at least 10 major  failures in recent intelligence reporting on Pyongyang&#8217;s missile and  nuclear programs, indicating that spy agencies essentially got in wrong  in assessing the July missile tests, and Monday&#8217;s efforts to detonate a  nuclear device. As the officials told Mr. Gertz:<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 85%;\">&#8220;&#8230;the  failures included judgments that cast doubt about whether North Korea&#8217;s  nuclear program posed an immediate threat, whether North Korea could  produce a militarily useful nuclear bomb, whether North Korea was  capable of conducting an underground nuclear test and whether Pyongyang  was bluffing by claiming it could carry one out.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The  harshest criticism was reserved for a recent National Intelligence  Estimate (NIE), and two recent assessments produced within the office of  the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte. Administration  officials claim the weak analysis undermined U.S. and Japanese  diplomatic efforts which might have prevented the nuclear test. Armed  with better intelligence, they argued, American and Japanese leaders  might have been successful in pressing China to use its influence with  North Korea, and prevented the underground test.<\/p>\n<p>White House  critics are right about the apparent intelligence failure&#8211;but only to a  point. Admittedly, recent assessments on the DPRK contained serious  errors. But poor intel on North Korea reflects decades of difficulty in  obtaining reliable information on Kim Jong-il and his regime. North  Korea remains one of the most closed societies on earth, and much of  Pyongyang&#8217;s missile and WMD activity remains shrouded by an active (and  effective) denial and deception program. As a result, there are numerous  intelligence gaps regarding North Korean capabilities and intent&#8211;a  fact that should be no surprise to the Bush Administration.<\/p>\n<p>In  reality, today&#8217;s critique is more of a retort to the DNI senior staff,  considered by many to be the likely source of the recently-leaked NIE on  Iraq. Officials who complained about the quality of analysis on North  Korea pointed the finger at the DNI&#8217;s most senior intelligence analyst,  Thomas Fingar, who disputed the famous 2002 NIE which claimed that Iraq  had large quantities of chemical weapons. According to the officials who  spoke with Gertz, Fingar carried over his skepticism to recent reports  on the DPRK, resulting in analysis that was heavily flawed. By leaking  their criticism to the press, the administration took a direct shot at  elements within the intelligence community believed responsible for the  recent NIE disclosures on Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>No one&#8211;repeat no one&#8211;has  suggested that Fingar was the source of recent leaks on the Iraq NIE.  However, direct criticism of a senior intelligence analyst is a bit  unusual, and by singling out Mr. Fingar, the White House is sending a  message to both him and his boss, Ambassador Negroponte: improve the  quality of your products, and tighten up your staff&#8211;or else. A White  House that once went out of its way to avoid criticizing the  intelligence community is no longer providing top cover for a DNI staff  still viewed (to some degree) as a bunch of leakers and malcontents.<\/p>\n<p>On  the other hand, it is somewhat unrealistic for the Bush White House-or  any administration-to expect an overnight improvement in our analysis of  North Korea. As Pyongyang improves its secure communications  capabilities, and gains more knowledge about our intelligence collection  efforts, it will remain extremely difficult to assess North Korea&#8217;s  actual intentions. The administration has every right to criticize the  DNI for poor assessments on the DPRK. But they should also challenge the  intelligence community to come up with a concrete plan for improving  collection and analysis&#8211;and provide the resources required to put the  plan into action.<\/p>\n<p>***<\/p>\n<p>One more thought: among his other  duties, Dr. Fingar is also responsible for the office which produces the  President&#8217;s daily intelligence brief (PDB). It will be interesting to  see how long Fingar remains in his position, since the White House is  clearly giving him a vote of no confidence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Readers of today&#8217;s Washington Times got a ring-side seat for the latest skirmish between the Bush Administration and elements within the intelligence community. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, administration officials severely criticized recent intelligence assessments on North Korea, describing them as &#8220;flawed&#8221; and hampered U.S. attempts to avert Pyongyang&#8217;s attempted nuclear test. Administration sources [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/109870"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=109870"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/109870\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=109870"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=109870"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cvnextjob.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=109870"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}